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 The current study examines the interrelationships of personality, cognitive biases, and 
stressful life events in the prediction of depression. Previous research has indicated that 
personality factors of Gray’s Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (Gray & McNaughton, 2000), 
the Behavioral Inhibition System and the Behavioral Approach System, predict concurrent and 
future depression symptoms. Other lines of research indicate that cognitive biases including 
negative cognitive content such as dysfunctional thoughts and negative cognitive processes 
such as attention and memory biases predict depression symptoms when measured after a 
negative mood prime or under cognitive load (Alloy & Abramson, 1999; Rude, Covich, Jarrold, 
Hedlund, & Zentner, 2001; Wenzlaff, Rude, Taylor, Stultz, & Sweatt, 2001). Finally, stressful 
life events predict the onset of depression symptoms (Miller & Rahe, 1997; Paykel, 2003; 
Tennant, 2002). However, little research examines the relationship among these factors, 
especially the relationship between personality and cognitive biases.  
 The current study found that high BIS, more stressful life events, and more negative 
and fewer positive automatic thoughts are associated with greater depression symptoms. BIS 




REINFORCEMENT SENSITIVITY, COGNITIVE BIASES,  











A Dissertation Submitted to 
the Faculty of The Graduate School at 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 












            
            
        ________________________ 
Committee Chair  




      This dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of The 






      Committee Chair ___________________________ 
                                                                   Rosemery Nelson-Gray  
 
 
Committee Members ___________________________ 
                                                                   Kari M. Eddington  
 
  ___________________________ 
                   Thomas Kwapil 
 
  ___________________________ 









                                     
Date of Acceptance by Committee 
 
                                     









I would like to thank Rosemery Nelson Gray, Thomas Kwapil, Kari Eddington, Stuart 





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
                Page 
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... vi 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... vii 
CHAPTER 
I.INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. 1 
Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory .............................................................................. 1 
Cognitive Biases ......................................................................................................... 4 
First Approach: Negative Mood Induction ................................................................. 5 
Second Approach: Adding Cognitive Load ................................................................ 7 
Third Approach: Measuring Implicit and Incidental Memory ................................... 8 
Differentiating Positive and Negative Bias ................................................................ 9 
Stressful Life Events ................................................................................................. 10 
Depression as a Continuum ...................................................................................... 11 
Statement of Purpose ................................................................................................ 11 
Hypotheses ................................................................................................................ 13 
II. METHODS ...................................................................................................................... 14 
Participants ............................................................................................................... 14 
Materials ................................................................................................................... 15 
Questionnaire Measures ............................................................................................ 15 
Beck Depression Inventory-II ................................................................................... 15 
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale ................................................ 15 
Beck Anxiety Inventory ............................................................................................ 16 
Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral Activation System Scales ....................... 16 
Sensitivity to Punishment/Sensitivity to Reinforcement Questionnaire ................... 17 
Recent Life Change Questionnaire ........................................................................... 17 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire—Negative ........................................................ 18 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire—Positive ......................................................... 18 
Cognitive Tasks ........................................................................................................ 18 
Imbedded Word Task ............................................................................................... 19 
Implicit Memory Task .............................................................................................. 19 
Incidental Memory Task ........................................................................................... 20 
Procedure .................................................................................................................. 21 
III. RESULTS ........................................................................................................................ 22 
Imbedded Word Task (IWT) Manipulation Check Results ...................................... 22 
Mood Induction Manipulation Check Results .......................................................... 25 
Implicit Memory Manipulation Check Results ........................................................ 25 
 v 
Hypothesis Testing ................................................................................................... 26 
IV. DISCUSSION.................................................................................................................. 34 
Predicting Depression ............................................................................................... 34 
Associations Among Cognitive Biases ..................................................................... 38 
Associations Between Personality and Cognitive Bias ............................................ 40 
Clinical Implications ................................................................................................. 42 
Limitations ................................................................................................................ 43 
Strengths ................................................................................................................... 44 
Future Directions ...................................................................................................... 44 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 45 
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................................. 46 




LIST OF TABLES 
                  Page 
Table 1. Means, standard deviations, skewness, and range of all variables by type ...................... 23 
Table 2. Pearson correlations of all variables ................................................................................ 24 






LIST OF FIGURES 
                  Page 
Figure 1. BIS and BAS CFA .......................................................................................................... 27 
Figure 2. BIS and BAS predicting depression symptoms .............................................................. 28 
Figure 3. BIS and BAS predicting depression symptoms .............................................................. 28 
Figure 4. BIS, BAS, and stressful life events predicting depression symptoms ............................ 29 
Figure 5. BIS, BAS, and stressful life events, and their interaction predicting depression                      
symptoms ................................................................................................................... 30 
Figure 6. BIS, BAS, stressful life events, and their interaction predicting depression 
symptoms ................................................................................................................... 30 
Figure 7. BIS, BAS, cognitive bias, and their interaction predicting depression ymptoms ......... 31 







            Extremes on Gray’s Reinforcement Sensitivity (RST; Gray & McNaughton, 2000; 
Pickering & Gray, 1999) personality traits and cognitive biases such as neg tive automatic 
thoughts, attention bias and memory bias predict risk for depression. We know very little about 
how RST and cognitive biases are related, but three possibilities exist: 1) they represent 
separate factors that independently predict depression; 2) they repr sent the same factor; 3) 
personality causes cognitive biases which then cause depression. Knowing h  these 
personality factors and cognitive biases are related would increase understanding of the nature 
of these risk factors and may help us design prevention and treatment interventions. The current 
study examined relationships of RST traits, stressful life events, negative automatic thoughts, 
and attention and memory biases in the prediction of depression symptoms. Although this 
cross-sectional study did not allow conclusions about which of the above possibilities is correct, 
it provided a preliminary examination of the association between these factors. It also examined 
the interaction of stressful life events with the supposed cognitive and personality diatheses. 
First, I describe each of these three components and then I will examine the interrelationships 
among these components. 
Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory 
Gray’s Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory is a biologically-based personality model that 
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may provide a useful framework for understanding depressive symptoms.  RST posits the 
existence of three major brain systems that underlie normal mood, orienting, and appetitive 
functioning. These brain systems are referred to as the Behavioral Approach System (BAS), the 
Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS), and the Fight-Flight-Freeze System (FFFS).  
The BAS is sensitive to cues of reward and relief from punishment and activates 
reward-seeking behavior, feelings of elation, and desire for reward, despite ri k or threat to the 
individual (Pickering & Gray, 1999). This system responds to unconditioned stimuli such as 
food, social contact, or sex, as well as to conditioned stimuli such as money. When activated by 
potential reward, the BAS activates the dopamine system in the ventral t gmental area (Depue 
& Collins, 1999), the basal ganglia, ventral striatum, and the dopaminergic fibers connecting 
the mesencephalon and mesolimbic system to the basal ganglia and thalamic nuclei (Harmon-
Jones, Abramson, Sigelman, Bohlig, Hogan, & Harmon-Jones, 2002) and stimulates an 
emotion similar to hope (Reuter, Stark, Hennig, Walter, Kirsch, Schienle et al., 2004). 
The BIS causes anxiety, inhibition, orienting, arousal, and passive avoidance when 
experiencing cues of punishment and novel stimuli. Brain structures involved include the septo-
hippocampal system and its connections to the frontal cortex, the locus coeruleus, and the raphe 
nucleus (Gray & McNaughton, 2000), areas identified by neuropsychological rese rch as 
important in anxiety. From an emotional perspective, the BIS produces anxiety and negative 
affect. Gray’s concept of the BIS is similar to the temperamental concept of behavioral inhibition 
identified in children (Coplan, Wilson, Frohlick, & Zelenski, 2006; Hirshfeld-Becker, Biederman, 
& Rosenbaum, 2004). 
Finally, the FFFS motivates avoidance and escape behaviors in response to both 
conditioned and unconditioned aversive stimuli and produces the emotion of fear. Corr (2004) has 
suggested that the BIS as previously studied actually reflects combined BIS/FFFS functioning. 
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Therefore, the current paper refers to BIS/FFFS functioning as BIS functionig.  
Developed as a modification of Eysenck’s personality theory of neuroticism and 
extraversion, Gray’s model represents a 30° rotation such that high BAS is a combination of high 
extraversion and high neuroticism and high BIS is a combination of low extraversion and high 
neuroticism. Implicit in Gray’s theory is the idea that an individual is predisposed to certain levels 
of BIS and BAS activation by genetic and biological factors and that environmental contingencies 
and learning modify these predispositions throughout development (Pickering & Gray, 1999). 
Both the BIS and BAS are relatively stable over time and over clinical state (Kasch, Rottenberg, 
Arnow, & Gotlib, 2002). 
            Extreme under- or over- sensitivity of these systems predicts psycho athology (Pickering 
& Gray, 1999). Low BAS predicts depression symptoms (Depue, Krauss, & Spoont, 1987; 
Kimbrel, Nelson-Gray, & Mitchell, 2007; Meyer, Johnson, & Carver, 1999) and is associated 
with persistence of those symptoms over an 8-month interval (Campbell-Sills, Liverant & Brown, 
2004). The BIS appears to be an anxiety system (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) and predicts 
subclinical anxiety symptoms (Kimbrel et al., 2007) and anxiety disorder diagnoses (Johnson, 
Turner, & Iwata, 2003). However, it appears that BIS also predicts both classical depression 
(Campbell-Sills et al., 2004; Kasch et al., 2002; Meyer et al., 1999) and mixed-an iety depression 
symptoms (Kimbrel et al., 2007; Hundt, Kimbrel, Mitchell, Nelson-Gray & Kwapil, 2007). High 
BIS sensitivity in adolescence predicts later diagnoses of depression (Johnson et al., 2003). In 
addition, BIS sensitivity predicts depression symptoms even when anxiety symptoms are 
partialed out (Hundt et al, 2007) and in individuals with no comorbid diagnosis of anxiety 
(Johnson et al., 2003). Thus, it appears that high BIS and low BAS both predict depression 




Cognitive models of depression (Beck, 1967; 1987) suggest that maladaptive schema  
lead to depression through a negative information-processing bias involving both negative 
cognitive content (dysfunctional attitudes and beliefs) and negative cognitive processes 
(attention and memory biases for negative information). Thus, Beck’s model proposes that 
cognitive biases are antecedent to and increase risk for depression. Other possible hypotheses 
include that cognitive biases may simply be a concomitant of depression or may be a 
consequence of having a previous episode of depression (the “scar” hypothesis). Attention 
biases, memory biases and dysfunctional attitudes have been consistently demonstrated in 
currently depressed or dysphoric individuals (e.g., Colombel, Gilet, & Corson, 2004; Gotlib & 
McCann, 1984; Hammen, Miklowtz, & Dyck, 1986; Hertel, 2002; Matthews & Antes, 1992). 
These explicit biases, however, are not consistently found before the onset or aft r the 
remission of depression symptoms when measured by endorsement of negative thought patterns 
or measurement of attention and memory bias in euthymic participants (Barnett & Gotlib, 1988; 
Hollon, Kendall, and Lumry, 1986; for a review, see Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). This evidence 
suggests that negative cognitive biases and content are simply concomitats of  depressive 
episode. 
Other research, however, has suggested a number of strategies for revealing cognitive 
biases that are latent or suppressed when the person is not currently in a depressive episode. 
People have a tendency to suppress negative cognitive processes and content in rd r to maintain 
positive mood (e.g., Matthews and Antes, 1992; Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003) which 
makes detection of these biases more difficult when a person is not depressed. There are three 
approaches that attempt to detect biases in order to predict the onset of future depression 
symptoms. In this line of research, remitted depressives are often participants of interest because 
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they have had at least one depressive episode and 50-60% of these individuals will go on to have 
another episode of depression (APA, 2000). Thus, remitted depressives are prime candidates for 
holding latent depressogenic cognitions. In addition, this line of research also often focuses on 
longitudinal studies of never-depressed individuals who during the course of the study become 
depressed or develop subclinical depression symptoms. This paper reviews results for both of 
these types of subjects using three different approaches to reveal cognitive bias. 
First Approach: Negative Mood Induction 
The first approach to detecting suppressed cognitive bias involves inducing a negative 
mood in participants. This is consistent with Beck’s (1967, 1987) cognitive theory of depression 
that suggests that schemas become activated when stressful events occur that resemble the type of 
events that originally led to the creation of the schema. This priming hypot esis suggests that 
under conditions similar to previous depressive episodes, such as sad mood, persons with 
remitted depression and persons at-risk for depression would show negative cognitive content and 
processes (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) whereas other individuals would not show 
cognitive biases despite negative mood. 
Consistent with Beck’s theory, studies that use a negative mood induction with 
cognitive bias questionnaires generally find that increased cognitive b as does distinguish 
remitted depressives from controls and distinguishes those who later develop depression from 
controls. Scores on the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman, 1980) distinguish 
participants with remitted depression from those without a history of depression only after a 
negative mood induction (Miranda & Persons, 1988). Similarly, when tested after anegative 
mood prime, automatic negative thoughts and dysfunctional attitudes were higher in 
participants with a previous history of depression than in participants without this history 
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(Roberts & Kassel, 1996). This effect appeared only when participants felt increased negative 
affect, not decreased positive affect. Finally, there is some evidence that this pattern is apparent 
in never-depressed individuals who later become depressed. After a negative mood prime, 
increased negative cognitive bias as measured by the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale and the 
Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CSQ; Alloy, Abramson, Hogan, Whitehouse, Rosbinson, 
Kim, & Lapkin, 2000) predicted both the first onset of depression (Alloy & Abramson, 1999) 
and recurrence of depression over a 2.5 year period (Alloy et al., 2000). Overall, th e is some 
evidence that cognitive content biases are stable, trait-like features detectable before a 
depressive episode and that these biases predict the onset of depression sympt m . 
Just as a negative mood induction reveals suppressed cognitive biases on 
questionnaires, it also reveals attention and memory biases on cognitive tasks th t predict 
depression. Teasdale and Dent (1987) demonstrated that when in a negative mood, previously 
depressed women had better recall for self-referent negative words than did never depressed 
women. Following a negative mood induction, biased recall was found among formerly 
dysphoric participants (Gilboa & Gotlib, 1997). Previously-depressed adults showed greater 
attentional bias for negative information on a dichotic listening task after a negative mood 
induction whereas their performance was no different from controls in the neutral mood 
condition (Ingram & Ritter, 2000). Following a negative mood induction, girls at risk for 
depression as defined by having a mother diagnosed with depression attended more to negative 
faces than did low-risk girls (Joorman, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007). Few prospective studie  have 
examined whether these cognitive biases predict the onset of depression but the results appear 
to be generally consistent with the mood induction hypothesis. For example, after a negative 
mood induction attentional biases assessed with a dot-probe task predicted increases in 
dysphoria longitudinally (Beevers & Carver, 2003).  
7 
 
Second Approach: Adding Cognitive Load 
A second approach to revealing cognitive biases involves measuring biased attention 
and memory during cognitive load; that is, while the participant is doing someother task that 
takes up cognitive processing ability, such as remembering a 6-digit number. Wenzlaff et al. 
(2001) suggest that cognitive biases are often hard to detect because those at risk for depression 
actively try to suppress negative information and negative thoughts. This suppression is 
achieved by two mechanisms: an operating process that promotes and turns attention to desired 
thoughts and a monitoring process that continually scans for negative thoughts and alerts the 
operating process to their presence. As the operating process requires mental effort, its 
efficiency can be reduced by a cognitive load. The more automatic monitor process, however, 
continues detecting negative thoughts. Thus, under cognitive load, the monitor will increasingly 
highlight negative information and bring failures to suppress negative thoughts to the attention 
of the individual, increasing negative mood (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). As predicted by this 
theory, previously-depressed participants score higher on a thought-suppression inventory 
(Rude & McCarthy, 2003), suggesting that these individuals may be attempting to suppress 
negative depression-related thoughts.  
Similar ideas come from other areas of research. Beevers (2005) posits a dual process 
model of depression in which associative or implicit cognitive processes underlie risk for 
depression whereas reflective or explicit cognitive processes can challenge the implicit negative 
thoughts if sufficient cognitive resources are available. Posner and Rothbart (2000) suggest that 
effortful attentional control mechanisms that allow shifting attention towards positive 
information and away from negative information are related to better regulation of distress. 
Matthews and Antes (1992) theorize that the tendency for individuals to fixa e on positive parts 
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of images more frequently than negative parts reflects a type of “perceptual defense” 
mechanism that attempts to maintain the attention away from depressogenic stimuli.  
Overall, this literature suggests that people have cognitive processes that reduce the 
perceived frequency and importance of negative events (Walker et al., 2003) a process that is 
disrupted in individuals with depression symptoms. Wenzlaff and Wegner’s (2000) model of 
cognitive suppression of negativity and Beevers’ (2005) dual process model provide interesting 
hypotheses about how this self-protecting bias might be disrupted in those at risk for depression 
symptoms.  
As predicted by these theories, the addition of a cognitive load to an attention task 
allowed detection of negative cognitive biases in never depressed participants (Rude, Wenzlaff, 
Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 2002) who 6 weeks later developed depressive symptoms. In another 
sample, cognitive load allowed detection of attention biases that predict d pression symptoms 
four months later (Rude et al., 2001). Similarly, cognitive load during an atte tion task allowed 
detection of attentional biases in remitted depressives who showed no negative bias without 
load (Wenzlaff et al., 2001).  
Third Approach: Measuring Implicit and Incidental Memory  
 Finally, various types of memory have been studied for their possible effect upon 
depression. One approach to detecting latent cognitive biases is to measure memory bias in 
such a way that participants are not aware that they are being tested for memory. Consistent 
with research previously discussed indicating that non-depressed individuals at risk for 
depression try to suppress their negative cognitive style and therefore t y to forget explicit 
memories of negativity, negative implicit memory bias should be associated with the risk for 
depression symptoms, although this effect has not been shown to be robust (Barry, Naus, & 
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Rehm, 2004; Watkins, Grimm, Whitney, & Brown, 2005). In addition, the studies that have 
shown significant implicit memory bias require that tests of memory be conceptual (i.e. regard 
word meaning) rather than perceptual (i.e., filling in a word stem).  
 Incidental memory bias has also been studied as a candidate. Incidental memory 
requires that the participant is not aware that they are encoding informati n for which they will 
later be tested. Prior research indicates that incidental memory is negatively biased in depressed 
participants and participants who experience a negative mood induction (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, 
& Williams, 1995; Direnfield and Roberts, 2006; Watkins, Martin & Stern, 2000). 
Differentiating Positive and Negative Bias 
The previously discussed studies of cognitive bias generally do not differentiate bias for 
negative information with lack of bias for positive information, yet there is some evidence that 
increased attention and memory for negative information is not synonymous with decreased 
attention and memory for positive information (Noguchi, Gohm, & Dalsky, 2006; Watkins et al., 
2005). Studies that measure memory and attention for negative, positive, and nutral i formation 
occasionally find enhanced bias for both positive and negative information simultaneously, 
relative to neutral information (e.g., Ingram & Ritter, 2000). Therefore, it appears that bias for 
negative and positive information can be measured independently.  
In fact, different personality traits predict negative bias and positive bias. Memory for 
positive information is related to BAS whereas bias for negative information is related to BIS 
(Gomez & Gomez, 2002; Gomez, Cooper, McOrmond, & Tatlow, 2003). BIS predicts 
expectancies of negative outcomes whereas BAS predicts expectancies of positive outcomes 
(Beevers & Meyer, 2000; Corr, Pickering, & Gray, 1995; Smith, Williams, Cyders, & Kelley, 
2006; Zinbarg & Mohlman, 1998); BIS predicts negative judgments of the self and situations 
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whereas BAS predicts positive judgments (Gomez et al., 2003; Heimpel, Elliot, & Wood, 2006; 
Jackson, 2001; Noguchi et al., 2006). 
Previous studies have tended to focus on negatively biased attention and memory or to 
simply compare the ratio of memory for negative events to memory for positive events. However, 
a recent review (Watkins et al., 2005) suggests that some studies of currently depressed or at risk 
participants find a lack of the positive bias as well as an increased negative bias relative to neutral 
stimuli. For example, Fogarty and Hemsley (1983) found that currently depressed participants 
had poorer memory for positive information and better memory for negative information 
compared to remitted depressives. Teasdale and Dent (1987) found that after  negative mood 
induction, remitted depressives had poorer memory for positive words as well as b tter memory 
for neutral words. These studies suggest that depression involves both poor attention and memory 
for positive information and increased attention and memory for negativ information. Thus, the 
current study investigated both negative bias and positive bias.   
Stressful Life Events 
Both personality and cognitive theories of depression suggest that stressful life events 
may be important in triggering the underlying vulnerabilities to psychopat logy. Stressful life 
events predict depression symptoms in both correlational and longitudinal studies (Miller & 
Rahe, 1997; Paykel, 2003; Tennant, 2002; Williamson, Birmaher, Dahl, & Ryan, 2005), 
although few have examined the interaction of personality, cognitive biases, and life stress in 
predicting internalizing symptoms. Of these few studies, stressful life events have been shown 
to interact with RST personality dimensions in the prediction of depressive ymptoms (Hundt et 
al., 2007), and have been shown to interact with attentional biases to predict increases in 
dysphoria seven weeks later (Beevers & Carver, 2003).  Overall, there is some evidence to 
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suggest that stressful life events interact with both personality and cognitive biases to predict 
concurrent depression symptoms.  
Depression as a Continuum 
As Ingram, Miranda, and Segal (1998) point out in their comprehensive review of risk
for depressive disorders, a great deal of evidence suggests that depression presents a 
continuum containing major depression, dysthymia, depressive personality disorder, and 
subclinical depression. Diagnosable major depression falls at the extrem  end of the continuum 
and minor or subclinical depression represents a qualitatively similar but less extreme variant of 
this phenomenon. Subclinical depression and major depression have similar risk f ctors, similar 
prevalence across genders and age of onset, and respond to similar interventions (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). The genes that place one at risk for depression symptoms are 
identical to those for major depressive disorder, and there is some evidence that periods of 
depression symptoms often precede a diagnosis of major depression in any individual (Ingram 
et al., 1998). Thus, studying depression symptoms may inform our knowledge of the diagnosis 
of major depression. 
Statement of Purpose 
The previously reviewed research indicates that both personality and cogitive biases 
are stable risk factors for the development of dysphoria and depression. Currently, esearch on 
Gray’s personality theory and cognitive biases tends to treat these as entirely separate risk 
factors. Research programs focus either on RST or on cognitive biases, yet it is v ry likely that 
these two factors are related. First, theories of personality tend to assume that personality 
influences cognition or that cognitive styles are a part of personality. Gray hypothesizes that the 
BIS, as part of its punishment-detection function, searches for, orients toward, and increases 
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attention towards threatening stimuli (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) which could lead to 
attention biases for negative information in individuals who are tempera entally high on BIS 
sensitivity. Memory biases may also result from increased attention to negative or threatening 
stimuli, as greater attention paid to a stimulus generally produces greater memory for that 
stimulus. Second, cognitive theories of depression state that cognitive biases result from life 
experiences that become incorporated into cognitive schemas (Beck, 1967; 1987). Some 
personality theories also postulate that these same life experiences also shape personality (e.g., 
Cloninger, 1993; Gray & McNaughton, 2000). Thus, it is unlikely that cognitive b ases and 
personality styles are completely independent constructs, and research must focus on examining 
them together. According to the literature reviewed, the most likely possibilities are that both 
cognitive biases and personality are in essence the same risk factor examined on a different 
level of analysis. 
The current study examined the relationship of RST and cognitive biases to current 
symptoms of dysphoria. To maximize the ability to detect cognitive biases, the current study 
measured cognitive biases in the four ways outlined above, namely, using a negative mood 
induction, adding a cognitive load, and measuring implicit and incidental memory. The first 
approach, using a negative mood induction, has been applied to both questionnaire assessments 
of negative cognitive content and to cognitive tasks that assess attention. To simplify and 
shorten the current study, however, this study only examined a negative mood induction added 
to questionnaire assessments of cognitive style. To summarize, there wer four assessments of 
cognitive bias: 1) a questionnaire measure of biased cognitive content, th  ATQ-Positive and 
ATQ-Negative, administered after a negative mood induction, 2) a cognitive task measuring 
biased attention, the Imbedded Word Task, administered under cognitive load, 3) an implicit 
memory task, and 4) an incidental memory task. 
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Finally, the diathesis-stress model of depression implies that both a stable diathesis 
such as genetics, personality, or cognitive bias and a stressor like a recent loss or change are 
associated with depression symptoms. In both cognitive theories and personality theories of 
depression, stressful life events are assumed to activate these diatheses. Thus, an integration of 
multiple predictors of depression should also include stressful life events. It was expected that 
stressful life events would  interact with cognitive biases and personality to predict concurrent 
depression symptoms. 
Hypotheses 
In summary, specific hypotheses are as follows: 
1. BIS will positively predict concurrent depression symptoms; BAS will negatively predict 
concurrent depression symptoms. 
2. Stressful life events will predict concurrent depressive sympto s.  
3. Stressful life events will interact with BIS, BAS, and biased cognitive content and 
processes to predict concurrent depression symptoms. 
4. ATQ-Negative, negatively biased attention and implicit and incidental memory will load 
onto the same factor as BIS and this factor will predict depression symptoms; ATQ-
Positive, positively biased attention and implicit and incidental memory will load onto the 






Two hundred and ninety nine college students participated in this study.  A college 
student population was used because cognitive biases and maladaptive personality styles are 
apparent in some individuals in this population, and college students typicall  experience 
relatively large numbers of stressful life events. Within this population, no specific selection 
criteria were enforced. Participants signed up for experiment appointments on the 
www.experimetrix.com website and received course credit for participation. 
Participants’ mean age was 19.6 (SD = 3.2) and 70.6% were female, 58.2% were 
Caucasian, and 28.4% were African American. Mean GPA was 2.9 (SD = .65). Family income 
varied widely (23.1% reported family income below $40,000, 23.8% reported income above 
$80,000). According to scores on the Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version, 
17.8% of participants had a prior history of depression, but only 13.4% of participan s self-
reported a prior diagnosis of depression. Ten percent reported some lifetime use of anti-








Questionnaire Measures   
Beck Depression Inventory-II  
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a 21-item 
inventory assessing depression symptoms that requires participants to select one of four 
statements that best describes their mood and state over the last two weeks. These statements 
inquire about sad mood, feelings of guilt, suicidality, and other depressive symptoms.  The BDI 
has good internal consistency (α =.89 to .93) and is widely used in research and clinical settings 
(Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998; Whisman, Perez, & Ramel, 2000).  
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale  
         The CES-D (Radloff, 1977) is a self-report measure of 20 depressive symptoms designed 
specifically for use in community samples. Examples of items from this measure include: “I felt 
that everything I did was an effort” and “I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help 
from my family or friends.” Participants rate the extent of their agreement with these items over 
the past week. The CES-D correlates substantially with other measures of depression such as the 
BDI (Radloff, 1977), although some research has suggested that the CES-D focuses more on the 
affective component of depression whereas the BDI focuses on the cognitive component 
(Skorikov & Vandervoort, 2003). Thus, both measures of depression were included to tap the 
entire construct of depression. The CES-D and has good internal consistency reliability (α = .90; 






Beck Anxiety Inventory 
 The BAI (Beck & Steer, 1993) is a 21-item self-report measure of anxiety included as a 
contrasting measure of psychopathology. Participants read each symptom of anxiety, such as 
sweating, hands trembling, and fear of the worst happening, and rate how much they were 
bothered by that symptom in the past month on a scale of 0 (Not at all) to 3 (Severely, I could 
barely stand it). The highest possible score is 63, with scores of 26 and above signifying severe 
anxiety. The BAI has excellent internal consistence (α = .92) and acceptable test-retest 
reliability and convergent and discriminant validity (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988).  
Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral Activation System Scales  
The BIS/BAS Scales (Carver & White, 1994) is one of two personality measur  used in 
this study to assess Reinforcement Sensitivity. It includes 20 items that measure a person’s 
emotional responding in situations that may evoke anxiety or impulsivity. Although there is a 
single BIS scale, there are three related BAS scales: Drive, Reward Responsiveness, and Fun 
Seeking. Examples of items on these scales include: “When I want something, I usually go all-
out to get it” (BAS Drive scale) “When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized” 
(BAS Reward Responsiveness) “I crave excitement and new sensation” (BAS Fun Seeking) 
and “Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit” (BIS scale). Confirmatory factor analyses 
indicate that the BAS scales load on a general BAS factor although the Reward Responsiveness 
scale also correlates positively with BIS (r = 0.2 to r = 0.3, Campbell-Sills et al., 2004; Leone, 
Perugini, Bagozzi, Pierro, & Mannetti, 2001). The BIS/BAS Scales havemoderate internal 
consistency with α ranging from .66 to .76 (Carver & White, 1994) and good convergent and 




Sensitivity to Punishment/Sensitivity to Reinforcement Questionnaire  
The SPSRQ (Torrubia, Avila, & Molto, 2001) contains two 24-item scales to measure 
Sensitivity to Reinforcement (SR) and Sensitivity to Punishment (SP), or BAS and BIS, 
respectively. Examples of items include: “Comparing yourself to people y u know, are you 
afraid of many things?” (SP scale) and “Do you like to compete and do everything ou can to 
win?” (SR scale).  The scales showed acceptable to good internal consistency with α in the 
range of .76 to .84 (O’Connor, Colder & Hawk, 2004). The SPSRQ has good factor structure 
(O’Connor et al., 2004) and convergent and discriminant validity (Torrubia et al., 2001). 
Recent Life Change Questionnaire  
The RLCQ (Miller & Rahe, 1997) is a 74-item self-report inventory that assesses recent 
stressful life events and changes in five domains: work, health, home/family, financial, and 
personal/social. This questionnaire is based upon Miller and Rahe’s (1997)assertion that both 
positive and negative events can be stressful. Examples of events included in this questionnaire 
are financial difficulties, ending a romantic relationship, birth of a child, and starting a new 
school or job. Respondents indicate if the event occurred in the past two years and if so, when. 
Events are weighted by severity based upon the 1995 rescaling in which participants were 
asked to estimate the severity of each event compared to marriage, which was assigned an 
arbitrary rating of 50 on a scale from 0 to 100. The RLCQ has good test-retest reliability (r = 
.83 over one month) and predicts depression, anxiety, medical illnesses, and psychological 






Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire – Negative 
The ATQ-N is a 30-item questionnaire measuring negative self-statements and automatic 
thoughts that are believed to play a role in depression. Participants rate on  5-point Likert scale 
how often certain automatic negative thoughts came to them over the past week. Scor s range 
from 30 to 150 with higher scores indicating more negative automatic thoughts. It ha  excellent 
internal consistency (.96; Dobson & Breiter, 1983; Hollon & Kendall, 1980). Scores on the
measure correlate very highly with current depression symptoms (Hollon &Kendall, 1980) and 
predict future depression symptoms and suicidal ideation (Chioqueta & Stiles, 2007). Convergent 
and discriminant validity is good and the mean score in non-clinical populations is 38.35 (Harrell 
and Ryon, 1983). 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire – Positive 
The ATQ-P (Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988) is a 30 item measure designed as a counterpart to 
the ATQ-N. Like the ATQ-N, scores range from 30-150 and participants rte on a 5-point Likert 
scale how often certain automatic positive thoughts came to them over the past week. The ATQ-P 
has good internal consistency reliability and convergent and discriminant validi y (Ingram, 
Kendall, Siegle, Guarino, & McLaughlin, 1995). ATQ-P scores are lower during episodes of 
depression and, for non-depressed persons, are higher after a positive mood induction.  The mean 
ATQ-P score in non-clinical participants is 101.53 (Ingram et al., 1995).  Previous studies report 
correlations of .29 to -.46 with the ATQ-N (Ingram et al., 1995). 
Cognitive Tasks 





Imbedded Word Task  
  The Imbedded Word Task (IWT; Wenzlaff et al., 2001) is designed to detect attentional 
bias. Wenzlaff et al. (2001) suggested that this task is less tran parent to participants and less 
vulnerable to self-presentational concerns than other attentional tasks. As in a word-search, 
participants searched for and circled words imbedded in a grid of random letters. Words were 
forwards, backwards and diagonally placed. The grid of letters was randomly generated by a 
computer program provided by SuperKids Educational Software Review. Ten negative, 10 
positive, and 10 neutral stimulus words were included, and each word was between 3 and 7 letters 
in length and was equated on frequency of use according to Francis and Kucera’s (1982) norms. 
This set of stimuli was previously piloted by Wenzlaff et al. (2001) who determined that the 
words were rated by participants as appropriately positive, negative, and neutral. Two sets of 
words were used, with ten different versions of the letter grid per word set to negate any 
idiosyncratic effects of word arrangements. Each participant completed only one Imbedded Word 
Task and had three minutes to identify and write down as many words as possible from the letter 
grid. Proportion of negative words to neutral words identified indicates degree of negative 
attentional bias; proportion of positive words to neutral words identified indicates degree of 
positive attentional bias. Participants completed this task under a cognitive load, remembering a 
novel six-digit number. As a manipulation check, participants were asked to report that number 
after the task and to rate how much they tried to remember it. 
Implicit Memory Task  
This task investigates implicit memory bias. Similar to tasks used by Watkins et al. 
(2000) in studies of depression, this task requires participants to view a list of 15 negative 
depression-relevant words, 15 neutral words and 15 positive words and rate how recently they 
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experienced something related to each word. These words were equated for fr quency and 
length based upon Francis and Kucera’s (1982) norms and were piloted by Watkins et al. 
(2000) to ensure that they have the appropriate valence. To minimize recency ff cts and help 
conceal the nature of the memory task, participants completed mathematics problems as a 
distractor task. Next, participants were given a task in which t ey generated a word that fits a 
definition. Answering with a word from the previous rating task was evidence of implicit 
memory for that concept. Distractor items—that is, items whose definition does not fit a word 
from the word rating task—were included to help prevent participants from realizing the nature 
of the task. Negative implicit memory bias was operationalized as ratio of negative to neutral 
items recalled from the first rating task. Positive implicit memory bias was operationalized as 
the ratio of positive to neutral items recalled. As a manipulation check, at the end of this task 
participants were asked if they were aware of any relationship between these two parts of the 
task.  
Incidental Memory Task 
 This task was designed to measure incidental memory bias for positive or negative 
information. In this free recall task, participants were asked to list any words that they 
remembered from the previous implicit memory encoding task. This is a common ethod of 
testing depression-congruent memory bias (Barry et al., 2004). Proportion of negative words to 
neutral words recalled indicated degree of incidental memory bias for negative information 
whereas proportion of positive words to neutral words recalled indicated degree of incidental 






Participants completed the study in small groups. After signing a consent form and 
being allowed to ask questions about the study, participants participated in th Imbedded Word 
Task under cognitive load. Next they completed the tasks to assess memory bias, the Implicit 
Memory Task and Incidental Memory Task, and filled out the depression, personality and life 
event questionnaires in random order. Finally, as a negative mood induction, participants were 
given the following prompt: “Write about a time in the past few years when you have been very 
unhappy. Please include details such as when this happened, what happened to cause you to 
feel unhappy, who else was involved, what you were thinking and what you were feeling.”  As 
a manipulation check, participants rated positive and negative affect before and after the mood 
induction with the following questions: “Right now, how positive is your mood?” and “Right 
now, how negative is your mood?” Response options ranged from “extremely” to “not at all” 
on a 7-point scale. After this, participants completed the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaires. 
To minimize post-study negative affect, participants were given a positive mood induction 
entailing writing about a happy time in their life. Afterwards, participants were debriefed and 






 Means, standard deviations, skewness, ranges and Cronbach’s alpha values re pr ented 
in Appendix A, Table 1. All scales had acceptable to excellent internal cosistency. Variables 
were normally distributed with the exception of the BDI, CESD, BAI, BAS-Reward 
Responsiveness, ATQ-Negative, and negative and positive incidental memory. BDI, CESD, BAI, 
and ATQ-N were normalized using the log transformation. Neither BAS-RR nor either incidental 
memory score could be normalized with transformations. Correlations of all vari bles are 
presented in Table 2.  
Imbedded Word Task (IWT) Manipulation Check Results 
To ensure that participants actively attempted to remember the 6-digit number in the 
cognitive load procedure, they reported that number after completing the IWT. Participants were 
given one point for each correct digit reported, regardless of position in the 6 digit number, and 
another point for each digit reported in the correct order. A participant who correctly remembered 
all digits in order would receive a score of 12. Numbers were scored in this manner to give 
participants partial credit for transposed digits. Mean score for this manipulation check was 11.15 
(standard deviation 1.69), suggesting that participants did remember the number.  In fact, 74.9% 
of participants remembered all digits in the correct order. Fifty four participants received a score 
of less than 10 points out of 12. Analyses were run with and without these participants and the  






Means, standard deviations, skewness, and range of all variables by type 
Variable Alpha Mean SD Skewness SE Skewness Minimum Maximum 
 Personality Variables  
BIS .77 20.31 3.98 -.47 .28    7  28 
BAS Reward Responsiveness .78 17.40 2.41 -1.53 .28    6  20 
BAS Drive .80 10.62 2.56 -.04 .28    4  16 
BAS Fun Seeking .75 12.28 2.42 -.39 .28    5  16 
Sensitivity to Punishment .84 11.77 5.29   .00 .28    1  24 
Sensitivity to Reward .77 11.79 4.25   .07 .28    2  23 
 Symptom Variables  
CESD .89 15.20 9.51   .84 .28    0   41 
BDI .90  8.28 7.57 1.63 .28    0   44 
BAI .91 11.58 9.73 1.17 .28    0  47 
 Environmental Variables  
Recent Life Event Questionnaire  .83 12.45 6.73   .60 .28    0  32 
 Bias Variables  
Negative Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire  
.96 55.46 22.60 1.34 .28  30 142 
Positive Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire  
.96 106.70 23.44 -.36 .28  45 150 
Negative Attention Bias --  1.36 .92   .45 .28    0    7 
Positive Attention Bias  --  1.18 .75   .36 .28    0    4 
Negative Implicit Memory --  1.46 .82   .74 .40    0    4 
Positive Implicit Memory --  1.39 .89 1.28 .40    0    5 
Negative Incidental Memory --    .78 .98 1.38 .28    0    6 







Pearson correlations of all variables 
 1 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 
1. BDI 1 .57** .81** -.09 .06 -.07 -.04 .03 .12* -.50** .74** .40** .41** .19** .35** .02 -.00 -.03 
2. BAI  1 .61** -.06 .11* -.10 .08 .02 .04 -.25** .40** .35** .39** .22** .45** .09 .01 .00 
3. CESD   1 -.08 .03 -.00 .04 .02 .13* -.50** .76** .38** .42** .16* .40** -.02 .01 -.05 
4. Positive Attention    
Bias 
   1 .23** -.01 .07 -.05 .03 .08 -.03 .04 -.11* .08 -.14* -.10 .05 .05 
5. Negative 
Attention Bias 
    1 .04 .09 .01 .13* .01 -.12* .09 -.03 -.09 -.01 -.05 -.05 -.05 
6. Positive Implicit 
Memory  
     1 .25** -.02 .17* .04 -.04 .10 -.07 -.10 -.07 .02 -.12 -.17* 
7. Negative Implicit 
Memory 
      1 -.08 -.05 .05 -.01 -.07 -.02 -.04 .08 -.03 -.08 -.02 
8.Positive Incidental 
Memory 




        1 -.06 .13* .11* .17* -.03 .17* .06 -.06 -.03 
10. ATQ Positive          1 -.52 -.06 -.39** .11* -.29** .21** .34** .26** 
11. ATQ Negative           1 .27 .44** .15* .32** -.08 -.07 -.03 
12. Stressful life 
events 
           1 .13* .17* .08 .14* .08 .14* 
13. Sensitivity to 
Punishment 
            1 .08 .63** .07 -.15* -.15* 
14. Sensitivity to 
Reward 
             1 .06 .24** .39** .39** 
15. BIS               1 .22** -.07 -.08 
16. BAS-Reward 
Responsiveness 
               1 .40** .45** 
17. BAS-Drive                 1 .39** 
18. BAS-Fun 
Seeking 
                 1 




Participants were also asked how hard they tried to remember the 6-digitnumber on a 
scale of 1 (did not try) to 7 (tried very hard). Mean score for this manipulat on check was 5.02 
(standard deviation 1.34), with only 1% reporting they did not try at all. Twenty seven 
participants gave a rating of less than 4 on the 1 to 7 scale of effort. Analyses were run with and 
without these participants and the results were not substantially different. Therefore, all 
participants were included for final analyses. 
Mood Induction Manipulation Check Results 
A further manipulation check concerned the mood induction procedure in which 
participants wrote a narrative detailing a recent negative event. A research assistant blind to the 
hypotheses coded the narratives for amount of detail provided and evidence of negative motions 
in the narrative. The experimenter verified each rating. Eighty nine percent of participants 
provided a substantial amount of details as evidenced by including at least 5 detailed sentences. 
Sixty eight percent of participants described a very emotionally egative memory using 
emotionally-laden words. Common negative memories included deaths of family members, 
breakups of serious relationships, etc.  Participants rated both positive and negative mood before 
and after the mood induction procedure using a 7-point scale.  Forty-four percent of participants 
experienced at least a two-point change in mood.  After the mood induction, 24.2% reported 
being in an overall moderately or very bad mood. Analyses were run with only these participants. 
ATQ-Negative and Positive became slightly better predictors of depression but overall results 
were similar. Therefore, all participants were included for final analyses. 
Implicit Memory Manipulation Check Results 
 After completing the implicit memory task, participants were asked if they noticed a 
relationship between the words they were asked to rate and the free-association task. Thirty-
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nine percent noticed a relationship and correctly identified what the relationship was. When 
analyses were run with only the participants who did not know the purpose of the task, results 
did not differ from results with the overall sample. Therefore, all participants were included in 
the final analyses. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypotheses were tested with structural equation modeling using AMOS version 17. 
Competing models and fit statistics are presented below. In general, fit statistics indicate 
whether an overall model matches the data well. Although a model may have a poor overall fit, 
certain parts of the model may still be significant predictors and should be retained in future 
models. The specific fit statistics presented in this study are in Table 3. Presented are the 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), in which higher values represent 
better fit and values over .90 are considered good fit. For Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA), lower values are better fitting and values less than .08 are 
considered good. Also presented are Akike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and the Browne- 
Table 3 
Fit statistics for SEM models 
Model χ2(df) CFI TLI RMSEA RMSEA 
90% 
AIC BCC 
Model 1 20.5 (7) .98 .92 .08 .04-.12 60.5 61.5 
Model 2  51.1 (13) .95 .88 .10 .07-.13 95.1 96.3 
Model 3 26.8(11) .98 .94 .07 .04-.10 74.8 76.1 
Model 4  43.6 (17) .97 .93 .07 .05-.10 97.6 99.3 
Model 5  161.5(61) .86 .91 .07 .05-.08 247.5 251.6 
Model 6  161.8(62) .86 .91 .07 .06-.09 245.8 249.9 
Model 7  1763.9(133) .47 .32 .20 .19-.21 1875.9 1883.4 
Model 8  171.2(75) .83 .88 .09 .04-.07 259.2 263.8 
Note. CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation; AIC = Akike’s Information Criterion; BCC = Browne-Cudeck Criterion. 
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Cudeck criterion (BCC) which allow comparisons between nested models such that lower 
values represent a better model, corrected for parsimony. 
The first model tested the factor structure of BIS and BAS. The relevant scales from the 
BIS/BAS Scales and the SPSRQ loaded onto BIS and BAS latent factors. BAS Reward 
Responsiveness was allowed to load onto the BIS latent factor because previous studies have 
demonstrated a correlation around r = .3 (Carver & White, 1994). Fit was good. 
The second model tested Hypothesis 1, that BIS would positively predict depression 
symptoms whereas BAS would negatively predict depression symptoms. In Model 2, pr sented 
in Appendix B, Figure 2, BIS and BAS latent factors from Model 1 were allowed to load onto 
the latent depression symptom factor, composed of BDI and CESD scores. Fit was poor. The 
BIS factor significantly predicted depression as hypothesized but the BAS factor did not. The 
reduction in fit from Model 1 was likely due to allowing BAS to load onto depression whe
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To test this idea, Model 3 was tested in which only the BIS latent factor loaded onto the 
depression latent factor. The fit was good and improved from Model 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that stressful life events would predict depression symptoms. 
This was tested in Model 4 in which stressful life events and BIS predicted depression 
symptoms. Based upon previous models indicating that BAS did not predict depression, the 
loading of BAS upon depression was fixed at zero. Fit was again good. As predicted, stressful 
life events and BIS were associated with depression symptoms.  
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Figure 2. BIS and BAS predicting depression symptoms. 





Hypothesis 3 predicted that stressful life events would interact with personality and 
cognitive biases to predict depression symptoms. The interaction of BIS, BAS, and stressful life 
events was tested in Model 5. Interactions in SEM are tested by computing late t variables for 
each indicator of the independent variable multiplied by each indicator of he moderator, and 
then allowing all of those variables to load onto one interaction variable (Littl , Bovaird, & 
Widaman, 2006). Only the latent interaction variables are presented in he model for clarity. 
This model had acceptable fit. The interaction of BIS and stressful life events was significant (p 
< .05) but the effect was small in magnitude. Next, because the interaction of BAS and stressful 
life events was not significant and including it in the model may have lowered fit, the same 
model was computed with the BAS*stressful life events interaction fixed at zero (Model 6). Fit 
improved only very slightly and the results were similar to the previous model. BIS, stressful 
life events, and their interaction were significant predictors of depression symptoms. 
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Hypothesis 3 also predicted that stressful life events would interact with cognitive 
biases to predict depression symptoms. This was tested in Model 7, in which all cognitive 
biases were allowed to interact with life events. Fit was very poor and no i teraction was 
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Figure 6. BIS, BAS, stressful life events, and their interaction predicting depression 
symptoms. 
Figure 5. BIS, BAS, stressful life events, and their interaction predicting depression symptoms. 
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significant, suggesting that cognitive biases did not interact with life events in predicting 
depression symptoms. 
 
Because the interaction of cognitive bias and stressful life events was not significant, 
the main effects of cognitive biases were examined in Model 8. In this model, BIS, stressful life 
events, and all cognitive biases were allowed to predict depression symptoms. Fit was poor. Of 
cognitive biases, only ATQ-P and ATQ-N were significant predictors of depression symptoms. 
However, these relationships were so high as to suggest that the ATQ may actuall  be 
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Figure 7. BIS, BAS, cognitive bias, and their interaction predicting depression symptoms. 
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 Hypothesis 4 predicted that ATQ-Negative, negatively biased attention ad implicit 
and incidental memory will load onto the same factor as BIS and this factor will p edict 
depression symptoms whereas ATQ-Positive, positively biased attention and implicit and 
incidental memory will load onto the same factor as BAS and will negatively predict concurrent 
depression symptoms. However, correlations suggested that there were only minimal or null 
relationships among positive and negative bias variables. A confirmatory f ctor analysis—not 
presented here—verified this.  
In deciding which model to accept, the Chi-square difference test cannot be used 
because the models are not nested. Instead, a comparison of the fit indices suggests that models 




























































However, since model 6 represents a more complex model that still maintains good fit, this 
model was accepted as the final model. This model indicates that BIS and stressful life events 
both separately predict depression symptoms and interact to produce depression sympt m .  
 Because previous research has often found that memory and attention bias, under certain 
conditions, are significant predictors of depression symptoms, a few alternate analyses were run. 
Wenzlaff et al. (2001) found that Imbedded Word Task scores were higher in a dysphoric group 
than a non-dysphoric group using a cutoff of 8 on the Beck Depression Inventory. Using the same 
cutoff, several ANOVAs were run to determine whether the dysphoric group had a significantly 
higher level of negative bias or lower level of positive bias. ATQ-Positive and ATQ-Negative 
differed between these groups, but no other bias variable did. Next, because some previous 
studies have found that people with a prior history of depression differed on cognitive biases from 
those without histories of depression, ANOVAs were run to determine if this was the case in the 
current sample. Prior history of depression on the Inventory to Diagnose Depression – Lifetime 
Version (17.8% of participants) was used as the independent variable, and again, ATQ-Positive 








 Most studies of the correlates of depression symptoms examine either personality or 
cognitive biases and perhaps their interaction with stressful life events. This study examined the 
relationships among RST personality traits, positive and negative cognitive content and 
processes, and stressful life events in predicting concurrent depression symptoms. 
Predicting Depression 
 Consistent with previous literature and with this study’s hypotheses, depression 
symptoms were associated with higher BIS (Campbell-Sills et al., 2004, Meyer et al., 1999), 
more stressful life events (Miller & Rahe, 1997; Paykel, 2003; Tennant, 2002), higher ATQ-
Negative scores and lower ATQ-Positive scores (Hollon & Kendall, 1980; Ingram et al., 1995).  
These results suggest that depression symptoms are associated with a personality style of being 
sensitive to threats and punishments, experiencing greater than average lif  str ss, and having 
many negative and few positive automatic cognitions. In addition, this studyreplicates previous 
work (e.g., Hundt et al., 2007) demonstrating an interaction of BIS and stressful life events in 
predicting depression symptoms. 
Although these results do not allow conclusions about the etiology of depression, they 
are consistent with a diathesis-stress model in which personality and cogitions may be a 
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diathesis triggered by life stress. A person with high BIS sensitivity may experience depression 
symptoms because BIS is associated with avoidance, negative affect, and gre ter negative 
response to stress. Avoidance can be especially problematic because it might lead the person to 
avoid things that would help relieve their negative affect such as socialitu tions or going to 
work.  Another type of avoidance, experiential avoidance, can prolong negative affect and lead 
to feelings of failure because of the futility of trying to avoid negative affect (Hayes, Luoma, 
Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). The interaction of BIS and stressful life events suggests that a 
person with high BIS will have a more difficult time coping with stressful life events and will 
experience more depression symptoms. Cognitions may play a role in depression b cause as 
Beck (1987) suggests, negative thoughts about oneself, the environment, and the future lead to 
negative affect and hopelessness. Experiencing stressful life events such a beginning college, 
the breakup of a romantic relationship, or the death of a family member incr ases negative 
affect and expends coping resources. A person with all three of these factors—high BIS, more 
stressful life events, and more negative than positive cognitive content—would have a 
particularly hard time resisting depression symptoms because high BIS leads her to be more 
sensitive to those stressors and negative thoughts are likely to be more believabl  and more 
difficult to rationalize away in the presence of actual evidence of failure or loss. 
Contrary to hypotheses, depression symptoms were not associated with BAS. In fact, 
the SR scale but not the three BAS scales had a small but significant positive correlation with 
depression symptoms. Although low BAS is typically associated with depression (Depue et al., 
1987; Meyer et al., 1999), some studies have found that low BAS does not predict depression 
symptoms (Hundt, Shah, & Nelson-Gray, in preparation; Johnson et al., 2003; Meyer & 
Hofmann, 2005) or only predicts anhedonic depression symptoms rather than anxious or 
ruminative depression (Hundt et al., 2007). In addition, low BAS is more likelyto predict 
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depression in studies that use a clinical sample (Campbell-Sills et a., 2004; Depue et al., 1987)   
than in studies that use a continuous sample (Hundt et al., in preparation; Johnson et al., 2003; 
Meyer & Hofmann, 2005) such as the current study’s sample, suggesting that low BAS may be 
present only in the most severe anhedonic depression. Thus, this study’s results are in line with 
some previous findings. 
Contrary to hypotheses, depression symptoms were not associated with either positive or 
negative attention bias, unlike in some previous studies (Rude et al., 2002; Wenzlaff et al., 2001). 
One possible reason for this failure may be that the cognitive load, remembering a 6-digit 
number, was not a strong enough manipulation. A few other previous studies have used 8-digit 
numbers instead (e.g., Rude et al., 2002). In addition, the attention bias task used in this study was 
selected for ease of administration in group settings and is less well estab ished than other 
measures of attention bias such as the dot-probe and the emotional Stroop. Finally, null results 
with this task may reflect the fact that previous research indicates that attention bias is more 
consistently and strongly linked to anxiety than depression (Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Williams, 
Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). Consistent with this, in the current study there was a small 
correlation of attention bias with BAI scores. These null results, in addition to other null findings 
in the literature cited previously, suggest that the association between attention bias and 
depression is not robust. 
In contrast to the literature on negative attention biases in depression symptoms, the 
literature on negative incidental memory bias more consistently shows an association with 
depression symptoms. Contrary to hypotheses, however, neither negative nor positive incidental 
memory was strongly associated with depression symptoms in any SEM model. Pearson 
correlations indicated only a very small but significant relationship between depression symptoms 
and negative incidental memory. These results lend only minimal support to the idea that 
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incidental memory biases are associated with depression, which is puzzling in light of previous 
findings. However, one explanation may be the restricted range of incidental memory in the 
current study. Many participants (27%) reported not being able to remember any words from the 
list at all. Some participants may have had trouble remembering the list of words because of 
several filler tasks intervening and some participants reported remembering words from the filler 
tasks or the attention task, suggesting that proactive interference of m mory may have played a 
role.  Another methodological problem is that participants completed packets at their own pace in 
large groups and could have read the instructions and simply skipped that page in order to finish 
more quickly and leave the experiment. This suggests that the current incidental memory task 
should be modified, including tighter experimental control, for future studies. Overall, however, 
this study’s findings also suggest that incidental memory for negative words is not strongly linked 
to depression symptoms. 
This study also predicted that depression symptoms would be associated with increased 
implicit memory for negative information and decreased implicit memory for positive 
information. Contrary to this hypothesis, there was no association of either type of implicit 
memory with depression symptoms. One possible reason for this is methodological: the 
manipulation check revealed that many participants were aware that implicit emory was being 
tested. This awareness may have allowed participants with depression symptoms to actively 
attempt to suppress negative information. However, the implicit memory effect in depression is 
not robust (reviewed in Watkins, 2002), and is typically found on only certain types of 
conceptual, rather than perceptual, implicit memory tasks. For example, although Watkins, 
Vache, Verney, Muller, and Mathews (1996) did find evidence that negative implicit memory 
predicted depression symptoms, Watkins (2000) did not. In a review of the literature, Watkins 
(2002) suggests that in order to successfully tap implicit memory, the encoding must involve a 
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great deal of conceptual elaboration and the test must also involve conceptual processing. 
Although in the current study both the encoding and test involve conceptual processing, the 
encoding instructions (“Think about and rate how recently you experienced something r lated to 
this word”) may not have encouraged participants to elaborate enough about the concept, similar 
to what Watson (2002) believes caused the null results in the Watson et al. (1996) study. Overall, 
it appears that based upon previous research and the current study’s results, implicit memory bias 
in depression is more difficult to find and less well-established than incide tal memory bias. 
Therefore, the current study’s findings do not stand in contrast to much of the literature on this 
effect. 
Although cognitive processes were only minimally associated with depression symptoms, 
cognitive content was strongly and significantly associated with depression. People experiencing 
depression symptoms had more negative automatic thoughts and fewer positive automatic 
thoughts. This is consistent with cognitive theories of depression (e.g., B ck, 1987) which 
emphasize the causal role of maladaptive thoughts. However, the results al o suggested that 
negative automatic thoughts are so strongly associated with depression (r  = .74) as to be virtually 
the same variable as depression. Positive automatic thoughts were also highly related to 
depression symptoms (r = -.50). 
Associations Among Cognitive Biases 
 This study hypothesized an association among negative cognitive biases and among 
positive cognitive biases. Contrary to hypotheses, there were only small or nu  relationships. 
Most previous studies of cognitive biases only examined either attention or memory or 
cognitive content. Recently, because of some equivocal findings about the relationships 
between biased attention, memory, cognitive content and depression, several researchers have 
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called for the inclusion of a variety of attention and memory tasks in single studies (Koster, De 
Raedt, Leyman, De Lissnyder, 2010). Some of these studies have found that performance on 
various cognitive bias tasks are correlated (Koster et al., 2010; Reid, Salmon, & Lovibond, 
2006; Rude, Durham-Fowler, Baum, Rooney, Maestas, 2010) but others have not (Dalgleish, 
Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Canterbury, Yule, 2003; Firk & Marcus, 2009; Gotlib, Kasch, 
Traill, Joormann, Arnow, & Johnson, 2004). For example, performance on two tasks thought to 
tap attention bias, the dot-probe and the emotional Stroop task, have sometimes b en found to 
be uncorrelated (Mogg, Millar, Bradley, 2000), and in one study that found a correlati n 
between memory and attention biases, those memory biases did not predict dysphoria (Koster, 
De Raedt, Leyman, De Lissnyder, 2010).  
Thus, although there are many studies that do find that different types of biased 
cognitive processes are related to each other and to dysphoria, there are also many that do not, 
suggesting that these effects can be difficult to find and may only appear under certain 
circumstances. One possible problem with this literature is that there are a wide variety of 
cognitive tasks used that can tap a wide variety of underlying processes (e.g., in attention: 
orienting, selective attention, disengaging attention, attention for visual vs. verbal stimuli). 
Relationships among these cognitive tasks are not well-established and finding significant 
effects appears to be dependent upon running those tasks in very specific ways. For example, in 
Posner’s spatial cueing task, significant attention biases are more likely to be found when 
stimuli are presented for 500ms or above than when they are presented for 250ms (Koster et al., 
2005).   Future research should determine which specific attention and memory tasks are most 
reliably associated with depression symptoms and under what conditions individuals with 
depression symptoms or at risk for depression exhibit biases. 
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 This study’s results suggest that cognitive content and processes are largely unrelated. 
This may be because cognitive content and processes rely upon very different brain 
mechanisms. Cognitive processes like orienting are typically not under voluntary control 
whereas cognitive content is, such that cognitive therapy focuses on modifying it. A person 
may not be aware that they are exhibiting biased attention and memory but likely is aware or 
can easily become aware that they are thinking negative thoughts. Based upon the current 
study’s results, cognitive content has a much closer relationship to depression than cognitive 
processes. This is consistent with Beck’s (1987) cognitive theory of depression which targets 
negative cognitive content such as maladaptive thoughts rather than basic processes such as 
attention. Although Beck’s theory includes biases like filtering—that is, paying more attention 
to negative information than positive—he assumes that the filtering is a conscious, voluntary 
action more similar to cognitive content in this study than basic attention processes like 
orienting. 
Associations Between Personality and Cognitive Bias 
I predicted that BIS would be associated with negatively biased cognitive content a d 
processes and BAS would be associated with positively biased cognitive content and processes. 
As expected, BIS was associated with negative cognitive content and BAS was associated with 
positive cognitive content. BIS was also negatively associated with positive cognitive content, 
consistent with the idea that high BIS can suppress the functioning of the BAS and suppress 
positive emotions (Corr, 2001; Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2000).  This suggests that people high in 
BIS have both more negative thoughts and fewer positive thoughts. Contrary to hypotheses, 
BIS and BAS did not predict attention biases and had only minimal relationships with 
incidental memory biases.  A few previous studies have found that BAS is associated with 
41 
 
positive memory and attention  biases and positive cognitive content whereas BIS is associated 
with negative memory and attention biases and negative cognitive cont nt (e.g., Corr et al., 
1995; Gomez & Gomez, 2002; Heimpel et al., 2006; Jackson, 2001). However, there are only  
few such studies and they use attention and memory tasks that differ from the ones used in 
research on depression-relevant attention and memory. In addition, the previous studies 
examining BIS/BAS and bias typically measure attention and memory for punishing or 
threatening stimuli rather than the depression-relevant stimuli used in the current study. This 
suggests that BIS may be responsible for attention to threatening stimuli rather than depression-
relevant stimuli. Rather than exerting its effects on depression via attention for depression-
relevant stimuli, BIS may predict depression due to avoidance behaviors, sensitivity to stress, or 
other mechanisms. 
 In addition, method variance may have decreased ability to detect relationships 
between BIS, BAS, and bias. BIS and BAS were measured with questionnaires whereas bias d 
attention and memory were measured with cognitive tasks. Relatedly, BIS and BAS 
questionnaire measures sometimes do not correlate very highly with BIS and BAS laboratory 
tasks. For example, Mitchell (2007) found that the CARROT, a measure of resp nsiveness to 
reward, was not correlated with BAS. Many studies have found non-significant or negative 
correlations between questionnaires and behavioral tasks that theoretically tap BIS and BAS 
(e.g., Hayden, Bodkins, Brenner, Shekhar, Nurnberger, O’Donnell, & Hetrick, 2008; Kane, 
Loxton, Staiger, & Dawe, 2004). If tasks that are purported to measure BIS and BAS often do 
not correlate with questionnaire measures of BIS and BAS, it is no surprise that attention and 
memory bias tasks which theoretically may tap only a single dimension of RST would have 
lower correlations with RST questionnaires. 
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 Another possible reason is related to the measurement of BIS and BAS through 
questionnaires. Although there is evidence that the BIS/BAS Scales and SPSRQ predict 
avoidant and reward-seeking behavior (e.g., Carver & White, 1994; Torrubia et al., 2001) it is 
very difficult to prove that they are measuring brain activity in the regions Gray pinpointed as 
involved in BIS and BAS. Even if this were the case, the questionnaires only ask about certain 
pieces of BIS and BAS functioning. For example, the BIS scale includes questions like “If I 
think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty “worked up” and “I worry 
about making mistakes.” However, Gray’s concept of BIS includes orienting towards 
threatening stimuli and the BIS scale does not include any questions that specifically ask about 
attention or orienting. This might explain why the BIS factor in this study had no relationship to 
attention for negative information despite theory predicting that it would. 
In summary, this study suggests that biased attention and memory as opertionalized in 
this study are not robustly associated with depression. Previous literature in this area finds 
inconsistent results, perhaps partially due to the wide variety of ways to measure cognitive biases.  
Overall, this study indicates that personality, stressful life events, and their interaction are 
associated with depression symptoms and are much more strongly associated with depression 
than biased cognitive processes are. In addition, biased cognitive content appears to b  part and 
parcel of depression. 
Clinical Implications 
 The finding that BIS, automatic negative and positive thoughts, and stressful life events 
are associated with depression suggests that therapy should target these correlates of depression 
as a way of alleviating distress. Several therapeutic interventions might reduce the effects of 
stressful life events: case management and coping skills such as exerci e, relaxation, and using 
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social support. First, case management might help the person discover res urces that would 
help remove the stress entirely. For example, if stress results from the loss of a job, case 
management might focus on helping the person apply for food stamps and job training 
programs. Next, coping and relaxation skills would help the person cope with stress that cannot 
be changed. Therapeutic interventions designed to ameliorate the effects o  a personality style 
high in BIS would address avoidance both of negative situations through exposure therapy and 
avoidance of negative emotions through acceptance techniques. Therapeutic int rventions 
designed to change negative automatic thoughts include cognitive techniques such as those 
involved in Beck’s (1987) cognitive therapy for depression. The treatments that this study 
implies would be important are the same treatments that research indicates are effective.    
 In addition, these results may help therapists identify people currently experiencing 
depression symptoms or people who may go on to develop depression. For example, a person 
presenting with a great deal of life stress should be thoroughly screened for dpression 
symptoms at their first appointment. Although this study does not allow conclusions about risk 
for future depression, whether high BIS “causes” depression may be irrelevant in a clinical 
context. For example, it may not matter if high BIS and depression symptoms are associated 
because of a third factor or because depression symptoms cause high BIS, in that BIS is still a 
marker of depressions symptoms. This suggests that a provider should screen carefully for 
concurrent depressions symptoms and also for depression symptoms in the future. 
Limitations 
This study examined depression symptoms rather than major depression per se. 
However, it is likely that depression symptoms represent a true continuum with major 
depression as the most severe end of that continuum. Persons (1988) suggests that cognitive 
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biases be studied in subclinical depression participants to avoid the confound of memory and 
attention deficits that typically co-occur with severe depression. Other limitations include the 
failure of the measure of implicit memory to function as expected in nearly half of the 
participants. Finally, this study did not allow clarification of whether cognitive biases result 
from personality features or vice versa, but as it is not possible to experimentally manipulate 
personality features the current study represented a first step in identifying how distal risk 
factors like personality, cognitive bias, and stressful life events are related.  
Strengths 
 Although this study does have several limitations, strengths of this study include 
comprehensive examination of various types of cognitive biases, both content and process, and 
inclusion of personality and stressful life events. No previous study has examin d depression, 
cognitive biases, RST, and stressful life events in tandem. In addition, this study examined 
positive and negative biases separately. Another strength is the use of structural equation 
modeling and latent variables for both depression and personality. Finally, this study included a 
variety of manipulation checks to determine whether the cognitive bias me ures functioned as 
expected.   
Future Directions  
This study found that RST, cognitive biases, and depression symptoms did notcorrelate 
as expected. However, there are a variety of ways to measure cognitive biases and future research 
should examine relationships between RST, depression, and other measures of cognitive bias. 
Because of the findings regarding the lack of relationships among various types of cognitive bias, 
future research should examine the coherence of and relationships between various attention bias 
and memory bias tasks and cognitive content questionnaires. Specifically, research should clarify 
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the nature of the attention and memory tasks and differentiate between various types of attention 
(e.g., early attention vs. late attention, sustained attention, orienting, difficulty disengaging 
attention from negative stimuli, etc.) in order to determine whether there are any types of biased 
cognitive content that are more strongly associated with depression.  
Conclusion 
In summary, these results suggest that depression is associated with stressful life 
events, high BIS, their interaction, and with more negative and fewer positive thoughts. 
Cognitive process biases played only a very small role in depression symptoms in the current 
study, suggesting cognitive processes are not strongly associated with depression. This study 







Alloy, L.B., & Abramson, L.Y. (1999). The Temple-Wisconsin Cognitive Vulnerability to 
Depression Project: Conceptual background, design, and methods. Journal of Cognitive 
Psychotherapy, 13, 227-262. 
Alloy, L.B., Abramson, L.Y., Hogan, M.E., Whitehouse, W.G., Rose, D.T., Robinson, M.S., 
Kim, R.S., & Lapkin, J.B. (2000). The Temple-Wisconsin COGNITIVE Vulnerability to 
Depression Project: Lifetime history of Axis I psychopathology in individuals at high and 
low COGNITIVE risk for depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 403-418. 
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS, 4th edition, text revision. Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Press, Inc. 
Barnett, P.A., & Gotlib, I.H. (1988). Cognitive vulnerability to depressive symptos among 
men and women. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 14, 47-61. 
Barry, E.S., Naus, M.J., & Rehm, L.P. (2004). Depression and implicit memory: Understanding 
mood congruent memory bias. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 28,3 7-414. 
Beck, A.T. (1967). Depression. New York: Harper and Row. 




Beck, A. T., Epstein, N., Brown, G., & Steer, R. A. (1988). An inventory for measuring clinical 
anxiety: Psychometric properties. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 56,
893–897. 
Beck, A. T., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive therapy of depression. 
New York: Guilford. 
Beck, A.T., Steer, R.A. (1993).  Beck Anxiety Inventory Manual. San Antonio: The 
Psychological Corporation. 
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Brown, G. K. (1996). The Beck Depression inventory (2nd ed.). 
San Antonio, TX: The Psychological Corporation. 
Beevers, C.G. (2005). Cognitive vulnerability to depression: A dual process model. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 25, 975-1002. 
Beevers, C.G. & Carver, C.S. (2003). Attentional bias and mood persistence as prospective 
predictors of dysphoria. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27, 619-637. 
Beevers, C.G., & Meyer, B. (2002). Lack of positive experiences and expectanci s mediate the 
relationship between BAS responsiveness and depression. Cog ition and Emotion, 16, 
549-564. 
Bradley, B. P., Mogg, K., & Williams, R. (1995). Implicit and explicit memory for emotion-
congruent information in clinical depression and anxiety. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 33(7), 755–770. 
48 
 
Campbell-Sills, L., Liverant, G. I., & Brown T.A. (2004). Psychometric Evaluation of the 
Behavioral Inhibition/Behavioral Activation Scales in a large sample of outpatients 
with anxiety and mood disorders. Psychological Assessment, 16, 244-254. 
Carver, C.S., & White, T.L. (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation, and affective 
responses to impending reward and punishment: The BIS/BAS Scales. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 319-333. 
Chioqueta, A.P., and Stiles, T.C. (2007). Dimensions of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale and 
the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire as cognitive vulnerability factors in the 
development of suicide ideation.  Behavioral and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 35, 579-
589. 
Cloninger, C.R., Svrakic, D.M., Przybeck, T.R. (1993). A psychobiological model of 
temperament and character. Archives of General Psychiatry, 50, 975-990. 
Colombel, F., Gilet, A., Corson, Y. (2004). Implicit mood congruent memory bias in dysphoria: 
Automatic and strategic activation. Current Psychology of Cognition, 22, 607-634. 
Connell, A.M., & Dishion, T.J. (2006). The contribution of peers to monthly variation in 
adolescent depressed mood: A short-term longitudinal study with time-varying 
predictors. Development and Psychopathology, 18, 39-154. 
Coplan, R.J., Wilson, J., Frohlick, S.L., & Zelenski, J. (2006). A person-oriented analysis of 
behavioral inhibition and behavioral activation in childhood. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 41, 917-927. 
49 
 
Corr, P.J. (2004). Reinforcement sensitivity theory and personality. Neuroscience & 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 28, 317-332. 
Corr, P.J., Pickering, A.D., & Gray, J.A. (1995). Personality and reinforcement in associative and 
instrumental learning. Personality and Individual Differences, 19, 47-71. 
Coyne, J.C. & Gotlib, I.H. (1983). The role of cognition in depression: A critical appraisal. 
Psychological Bulletin, 94, 472-505. 
Dalgleish, T., Taghavi, R., Neshat-Doost, H., Moradi, A., Canterbury, R., & Yule, W. (2003). 
Patterns of processing bias for emotional information across clinical disorders: A 
comparison of attention, memory, and prospective cognition in children and 
adolescents with depression, generalized anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder. 
JOURNAL OF CLINICAL CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY, 32, 10–21. 
Dozois, D.J.A., Dobson, K.S., & Ahnberg J.L. (1998). A psychometric evaluation of the Beck 
Depression Inventory-II. Psychological Assessment, 10, 83-89. 
Depue, R.A. & Collins, P.F. (1999). Neurobiology of the structure of personality: Dopamine, 
facilitation of incentive motivation, and extraversion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
22, 491-569. 
Depue, R.A., Krauss, S.P., & Spoont, M.R. (1987). A two-dimensional threshold model of 
seasonal bipolar affective disorder. In D. Magnusson and A. Ohman (Eds.). 
Psychopathology: An interactional perspective. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Direnfeld, D.M. & Roberts, J.E. (2006). Mood congruent memory in dysphoria: The roles of state 
affect and cognitive style. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 1275-1285. 
50 
 
Dobson, K.S. & Breiter, H.J. (1980). Cognitive assessment of depression: Reliability and 
validity of three measures. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 92, 107-109. 
Firk, C. & Markus, C.R. (2009). Differential effects of 5-HTTLPR genotypes on mood, 
memory, and attention bias following acute tryptophan depletion and stress exposure. 
Psychopharmacology, 4,805-818. 
Fogarty, S.J. & Helmsley, D.R. (1983). Depression and the accessibility of memories: A 
longitudinal study. British Journal of Psychiatry, 142, 32-237. 
Francis, W. N., & Kucera, H. (1982). Frequency analysis of English usage: Lexicon and 
grammar. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Gable, S.L., Reis, H.T., & Elliot, A.J. (2000). Behavioral activation and inhib tion in everyday 
life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 1135-1149. 
Gilboa, E. & Gotlib, I.H. (1997). Cognitive biases and affect persistence in previously 
dysphoric and never-dysphoric individuals. Cognition and Emotion, 11, 517-538. 
Gomez, R., Cooper, A., McOrmond, R., & Tatlow, S. (2003). Gray’s reinforcement sensitivity 
theory: Comparing the separable and joint subsystems hypotheses in the prediction of 
pleasant and unpleasant emotional information processing. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 37, 289-305. 
Gomez, A., & Gomez, R. (2002). Personality traits of the behavioral approach and inhibitio  
systems : Associations with processing of emotional stimuli. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 32, 1299-1316. 
51 
 
Gotlib, I.H., Kasch, K.L., Traill, S., Joormann, J., Arnow, B.A. and Johnson, S.L. (2004). 
Coherence and specificity of information-processing biases in depression and social 
phobia, Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 113, 386–398. 
Gotlib, I.H., & McCann, C.D. (1984). Construct accessibility and depression: An examination of 
cognitive and affective factors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 27-
439. 
Gray, J.A. & McNaughton, N. (2000). The Neuropsychology of Anxiety, 2nd ed. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hammen, C., Miklowtz, D.J., & Dyck, D.G. (1986). Stability and severity parameters of 
depressive self-schema responding. Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology, 4, 23-45. 
Harmon-Jones, E., Abramson, L.Y., Sigelman, J., Bohlig, A., Hogan, M.E., & Harmon-Jones, C. 
(2002). Proneness to hypomania/mania symptoms or depression symptoms and 
asymmetrical frontal cortical responses to an anger-evoking event. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 82, 610-618. 
Harrell, T.H. and Ryon, N.B. (1983). Cognitive-behavioral assessment of depression: Clinical 
validation of the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 51, 721-725. 
Hayden, E.P., Bodkins, M., Brenner, C., Shekhar, A., Nurnberger, J.I., O’Donnell, B., Hetrick, 
W.P. (2008). A multimethod investigation of the Behavioral Activation System in bipolar 
disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 117, 164-170. 
52 
 
Hayes, S. C., Luoma, J., Bond, F., Masuda, A., and Lillis, J. (2006). Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy: Model, processes, and outcomes. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 44, 1-25. 
Heimpel, S.A., Elliot, A.J., & Wood,  J.V. (2006). Basic Personality Disposition, Self-Esteem, 
and Personal Goals: An Approach-Avoidance Analysis. Journal of Personality, 74, 1293-
1320. 
Hertel, P.T. (2002). Cognitive biases in anxiety and depression: Introduction to the special 
issue. Cognition and Emotion, 16, 321-330. 
Hirshfeld-Becker, D.A., Biederman, J., & Rosenbaum, J.F. (2004). Behavioral Inhibition. In T.L. 
Morris & J.S. March (Eds.), Anxiety disorders in children and adolescents (2 d ed.). New 
York: Guildford Press.  
Hollon, S.D., Kendall, P.C., & Lumry, A. (1986). Specificity of depressotypic cognitions in 
clinical depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95, 52-59. 
Hollon, S.D., & Kendall, P.C. (1980). Cognitive self-statements in depression: Development of 
an automatic thoughts questionnaire. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 4, 383-395. 
Hundt, N.E., Kimbrel, N.A., Mitchell, J.T., Nelson-Gray, R.O. & Kwapil, T.R. (2007). The 
Interaction of Reinforcement Sensitivity and Life Events in the Prediction of 
Anhedonic Depression and Mixed Anxiety-Depression Symptoms. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 43, 1001-1012. 
53 
 
Ingram, R.E., Kendall, P.C., Siegle, G., Guarino, J., McLaughlin, S. (1995). Psychometric 
properties of the positive automatic thoughts questionnaire. Psychological Assessment, 
7, 495-507. 
Ingram, R.E., Miranda, J., & Segal, Z.V. (1998). Cognitive vulnerability to depression. New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Ingram, R.E. & Ritter, J. (2000). Vulnerability to depression: Cognitive reactivity and parental 
bonding in high-risk individuals. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 588-596. 
Ingram, R. E., & Wisnicki, K. S. (1988). Assessment of automatic positive cognition. 
JOURNAL OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY, 56, 898–902. 
Jackson, C.J. (2001). Comparison between Eysenck’s and Gray’s models of personality in the 
prediction of motivational work criteria. Personality and Individual Differences, 31, 129-
144. 
Johnson, S.L., Turner, R.J., & Iwata, N. (2003). BIS/BAS levels and psychiatric disorder: An 
epidemiological study. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 25, 
25-36. 
Joorman, J., Talbot, L., and Gotlib, I.H. (2007).  Biased processing of emotional information in 
girls at risk for depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 116, 135-143. 
Kane, Tamsin A., Natalie J. Loxton, Petra K. Staiger, Sharon Dawe. (2004). Does the tendency to 
act impulsively underlie binge eating and alcohol use problems? An empirical 
investigation. Personality and Individual Differences, 36, 83-94. 
54 
 
Kasch, K.L., Rottenberg, J, Arnow, B.A., & Gotlib, I.H. (2002). Behavioral Activation and 
Inhibition Systems and the severity and course of depression. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 111, 589-597. 
Kimbrel, N.A., Nelson-Gray, R.O., & Mitchell, J.T. (2007). Reinforcement Sensitivity 
and Maternal Style as Predictors of Psychopathology. 
Koster, E.H.W., De Raedt, R., Goeleven, E., Franck, E., and Crombez, G. (2005). Mood-
congruent attentional bias in dysphoria: maintained attention to and impaired 
disengagement from negative information, Emotion, 5, 446–455.  
Koster, E.H.W., De Raedt, R., Leyman, L., De Lissnyder, E. (2010). Mood-congruent 
attention and memory bias in dysphoria: Exploring the coherence among 
information-processing biases. Behavior Research and Therapy, 48, 219-225. 
Leone, L., Perugini, M., Bagozzi, R.P, Pierro, A., & Mannetti, L. (2001) Construct validity and 
generalizability of the Carver-White BIS/BAS scales. European Journal of Personality, 
15, 373-390. 
Little, T.D., Bovaird, J.A., & Widaman, K.F. (2006). On the merits of orthogonalizing powered 
and squared product terms: Implications for modeling latent variable interactions. 
Structural Equation Modeling, 13, 479-519. 
Matthews, G.R. & Antes, J.R. (1992). Visual attention and depressions: Cognitive biases in the 




Meyer, T.D. & Hofmann, B.U. (2005). Assessing the dysregulation of the behavioral activation 
system: The Hypomanic Personality Scale and the BIS-BAS Scales. Journal of 
Personality Assessment, 85, 318-324. 
Meyer, B., Johnson, S.L., & Carver, C.S. (1999). Exploring behavioral activation and ihibition 
sensitivities among college students at risk for bipolar spectrum symptomatology. 
Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 21, 275-292. 
Miller, M.A. and Rahe, R.H. (1997). Life changes scaling for the 1990s. Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, 43, 279-292. 
Miranda, J. & Persons, J.B. (1988). Dysfunctional attitudes are mood-state dependent. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 97, 6-79. 
Mitchell, J.T. (2007). Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory, Adult AD/HD Symptoms, and 
Comorbidity: An Examination of Pathways based on Behavioral Approach and 
Inhibition. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro. 
Mogg, K. & Bradley, B.P. (2005). Attention bias in Generalized Anxiety Disorder versus 
depressive disorder. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 29, -45. 
Mogg, K., Millar, N., & Bradley, B. P. (2000). Biases in eye movements to threatening facial 
expressions in generalized anxiety disorder and depressive disorder. JOURNAL OF 
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY, 109, 695–704. 
Noguchi, K., Gohm, C.L., & Dalsky, D.J. (2006). Cognitive tendencies of focusing on positive 
and negative information. Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 891-910. 
56 
 
O’Connor, R.M., Colder, C.R., & Hawk, L.W. (2004). Confirmatory factor analysis of the 
Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 37, 985-1002. 
Paykel, E.S. (2003) Life events and affective disorders. Acta Neurologica Scandinavica, 108, 61-
66. 
Pickering, A.D., & Gray, J.A. (1999). The neuroscience of personality. In L.A. Pervin & O.P. 
John (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (2nd ed., pp. 277-299). New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Posner, M.I. & Rothbart, M.K. (2000). Developing mechanisms of self-regulation. Development 
and Psychopathology, 12, 427-441. 
Radloff, L.S. (1977). The CES-D Scale: A new self-report depression scale for research in the 
general population. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT, 1, 385-401. 
Reid, S.C., Salmon, K., Lovibond, P.F. (2006). Cognitive biases in childhood anxiety, depression, 
and aggression: Are they pervasive or specific? Cognitive Therapy and Research, 30, 
531-549. 
Rude, S.S., Covich, J., Jarrold, W., Hedlund, S., & Zentner, M. (2001). Detecting depressive 
schemata in vulnerable individuals: Questionnaires versus laboratory tasks. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 25, 103-116. 
Rude, S.S., Durham-Fowler, J.A., Baum, E.S., Rooney, S.B., & Maestas, K.L. (2010). Self-
report and cognitive processing measures of depressive thinking predict subsequent 
major depressive disorder. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 34, 107-115. 
57 
 
Rude, S.S., & McCarthy, C.T. (2003). Emotional functioning in depressed and depression-
vulnerable college students. Cognition & Emotion, 17, 799-806. 
Rude, S.S., Wenzlaff, R.M., Gibbs, B., Vane, J., & Whitney, T. (2002). Negative processing 
biases predict subsequent depressive symptoms. Cognition and Emotion, 16, 423-440. 
Reuter, M., Stark, R., Hennig, J., Walter, B., Kirsch, P., Schienle, A., & Vaitl, D. (2004). 
Personality and emotion: Test of Gray’s personality theory by means of an fMRI study. 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 118, 462-469. 
Roberts, J.E. & Kassel, J.D. (1996). Mood state dependence in cognitive vulnerability to 
depression: The roles of positive and negative affect. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
20, 1-12. 
Skorikov, V. B. & Vandervoort, D.J. (2003). Relationships between the underlying constructs 
of the Beck Depression Inventory and the Center for Epidemiological Studies 
Depression Scale. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 63, 319-335. 
Smith, G.T., Williams, S.F., Cyders, M.A., & Kelley, S. (2006). Reactive personality-
environment transactions and adult developmental trajectories. Developmental 
Psychology,42, 877-887. 
Teasdale, J.D. & Dent, J. (1987). Cognitive vulnerability to depression: An investigation of two 
hypotheses. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 26, 113-126. 
Tennant, C. (2002). Life events, stress, and depression: A review of the findings. Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 36, 173-182. 
58 
 
Torrubia, R. Avila, C., & Moltó, C.X. (2001). The Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to 
Reinforcement Questionnaire (SPSRQ) as a measure of Gray’s anxiety and impulsivity 
dimensions. Personality and Individual Differences, 31, 837-862. 
Walker, R.W., Skowronski, J.J., Thompson, C.P. (2003). Life is pleasant—and memory helps 
to keep it that way! Review of General Psychology, 7, 203-210. 
Watkins, P.C. (2002). Implicit memory bias in depression. Cognition and Emotion, 16, 381-402. 
Watkins, P.C., Grimm, D.L., Whitney, A., & Brown, A. (2005). Unintentional memory bias in 
depression. Hauppauge, NY, US: Nova Biomedical Books, pp. 59-86. 
Watkins, P.C., Martin, C.K., & Stern, L.D. (2000). Unconscious memory bias in depression: 
Perceptual and conceptual processes. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 282-289. 
Watkins, P.C., Vache, K., Verney, S.P., Muller, S. & Mathews, A. (1996). Unconscious mood-
congruent memory bias in depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 105, 34-41. 
Wenzlaff, R.M. & Wegner, D.M. (2000). Thought suppression. Annual Review of Psychology, 
51, 59-91. 
Wenzlaff, R.M., Rude, S.S., Taylor, C.J., Stultz, C.H., & Sweatt, R.A. (2001). Beneath th  veil 
of thought suppression: Attentional bias and depression risk. Cognition and Emotion, 
15, 435-452.Wenzlaff, R.M. & Wegner, D.M. (2000). Thought suppression. An ual 
Review of Psychology, 51, 59-91. 
Weissman, A. N. (1980). Assessing depressogenic attitudes: A validation study. Paper 
presented at the 51st Annual Meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, 
59 
 
Hartford.Paykel, E.S. (2003). Life events and affective disorders. Acta Neurologica 
Scandinavica, 108, 61-66. 
Whisman, M.A., Perez, J.E., & Ramel, W., (2000). Factor structure of the Beck Depression 
Inventory, Second Edition, in a student sample. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 56, 
545-551. 
Williamson, D. E., Birmaher, B., Dahl, R. E., and Ryan, N.D. (2005) Stressful life events in 
anxious and depressed children. Journal of Child and Adolescent 
Psychopharmacology, 15, 71-580. 
Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (1997). Cognitive 
psychology and emotional disorders (2nd ed.). Chichester, England: Wiley.  
Zinbarg, R.E., & Mohlman, J. (1998). Individual differences in the acquisition of affectively 
valenced associations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1024-1040. 
60 
APPENDIX A: MATERIALS 
Imbedded Word Task Words 









































































































































Read each statement and rate your agreement with it on a scale of 0-3. 
 
1. If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty "worked up." 
2. When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized. 
3. I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun. 
4. When I want something, I usually go all-out to get it. 
5. I worry about making mistakes. 
6. When I'm doing well at something, I love to keep at it. 
7. I go out of my way to get things I want. 
8. I crave excitement and new sensation. 
9. Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit. 
10.When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly. 
11. If I see a chance to get something I want, I move on it right away. 
12. I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun. 
13. I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me. 
14. It would excite me to win a contest. 
15. When I go after something I use a "no holds barred" approach. 
16. I often act on the spur of the moment. 
17. Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or 
nervousness. 
18. When I see an opportunity for something I like, I get excited right away. 
19. I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something. 
20. I have very few fears compared to my friends. 
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Sensitivity to Punishment Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ) 
 
1. Do you often refrain from doing something because you are afraid of it being illgal?  
2. Does the good prospect of obtaining money motivated you strongly to do some things?  
3. Do you prefer not to ask for something when you are not sure you will obtain it? 
4. Are you frequently encouraged to act by the possibility of being valued in your work, in 
your studies, with your friends or with your family?  
5. Are you often afraid of new or unexpected situations?  
6. Do you often meet people that you find physically attractive?  
7. Is it difficult for you to telephone someone you do not know?  
8. Do you like to take some drugs because of the pleasure you get from them? 
9. Do you often renounce (give up) your rights when you know you can avoid a quarrel with 
a person or an organization?  
10. Do you often do things to be praised? 
11. As a child, were you troubled by punishment at home or in school?  
12. Do you like being the center of attention at a party or a social meeting? 
13. In tasks that you are not prepared for, do you attach great importance to the possibility of 
failure?  
14. Do you spend a lot of your time on obtaining a good image?  
15. Are you easily discouraged in difficult situations?  
16. Do you need people to show their affection for you all the time?  
17. Are you a shy person?  
18. When you are in a group, do you try to make your opinions the most intelligent or the 
funniest?  
19. Whenever possible, do you avoid demonstrating your skills for fear of being 
embarrassed?  
20. Do you often take the opportunity to pick up people you find attractive?  
21. When you are with a group, do you find you have difficulties selecting a good topic to 
talk about?  
22. As a child, did you do a lot of things to get people's approval?  
23. Is it often difficult for you to fall asleep when you think about things you have done or 
must do?  
24. Does the possibility of social advancement move you to action, even if this involves not 
playing fair?  
25. Do you think a lot before complaining in a restaurant if your meal is not well prepared?  
26. Do you generally give preference to those activities that imply an immediate gain?  
27. Would you be bothered if you had to return to a store when you noticed you were given 
the wrong change?  
28. Do you often have trouble resisting the temptation of doing forbidden things? 
29. Whenever you can, do you avoid going to unknown places?  
30. Do you like to compete and do everything you can to win?  
31. Are you often worried by things that you said or did? 
32. Is it easy for you to associate tastes and smells to very pleasant events?  
33. Would it be difficult for you to ask your boss for a raise (salary increase)? 
34. Are there a large number of objects or sensations that remind you of pleasant vents?  
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35. Do you generally try to avoid speaking in public?  
36. When you start to play with a slot machine, is it often difficult for you to stop?  
37. Do you, on a regular basis, think that you could do more things if it was not for your 
insecurity or fear?  
38. Do you sometimes do things for quick gains?  
39. Comparing yourself to people you know, are you afraid of many things?  
40. Does your attention easily stray from your work in the presence of an attractive stranger?  
41. Do you often find yourself worrying about things to the extent that performance in 
intellectual abilities is impaired?  
42. Are you interested in money to the point of being able to do risky jobs?  
43. Do you often refrain from doing something you like in order not to be rejected or 
disapproved of by others? 
44. Do you like to put competitive ingredients in all of your activities?  
45. Generally, do you pay more attention to threats than pleasant events?  
46. Would you like to be a socially powerful position?  
47. Do you often refrain from doing something because of your fear of being embarrassed?  




Recent Life Change Questionnaire (RLCQ) 
 
Health 
In the past 6 months, have you experienced an illness or injury which: 
1. Kept you in bed a week or more or sent you to the hospital? 
2. Was less serious than above? 
3. Major dental work? 
4. A major change in eating habits? 
5. A major change in sleeping habits? 
6. A major change in your usual type and/or amount of recreation? 
 
Work 
7. A change to a new type of work? 
8. A change in your work hours or conditions? 
A change in your responsibilities at work: 
9. More responsibilities? 




Troubles at work: 
14. With your boss? 
15. With co-workers? 
16. With persons under your supervision? 
17. Other work troubles? 
18. A major business readjustment? 
19. A retirement 
20. Laid off from work? 
21. Fired from work? 
22. A correspondence course to help you in your work? 
 
Home and Family 
23. A major change in your living conditions (home improvements or a decline in your home 
or neighborhood)? 
A change in residence: 
24. Move within the same town or city? 
25. Move to a different town, city, or state? 
26. A change in family “get togethers”? 
27. A major change in the health or behavior of a family member (illness, accidents, drug or 
disciplinary problems, etc.?) 
28. Marriage? 
29. A pregnancy? 
30. A miscarriage or an abortion? 
A gain of a new family member: 
31. Birth of a child? 
32. Adoption of a child? 
33. A relative moving in with you?
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34. A spouse beginning or ending work outside the home? 
A child leaving home: 
35. To attend college? 
36. Due to marriage? 
37. For other reasons? 
38. A change in arguments with your spouse? 
39. In-law problems? 
A change in the marital status of your parents: 
40. Divorce? 
41. Remarriage? 
A separation from your spouse: 
42. Due to work? 
43. Marital problems? 
44. A divorce? 
45. The birth of a grandchild? 
46. The death of a spouse? 
The death of another family member: 
47. Child? 
48. Brother or sister? 
49. Parent? 
 
Personal and Social 
50. A change in personal habits (your dress, friends, life-style, etc.)? 
51. Beginning or ending school or college? 
52. A change of school or college? 
53. A change in political beliefs? 
54. A change in religious beliefs? 
55. A change in social activities (clubs, movies, visiting, etc.)? 
56. A vacation? 
57. A new, close personal relationship? 
58. An engagement to marry? 
59. Girlfriend or boyfriend problems? 
60. Sexual difficulties? 
61. A “falling out” of a close personal relationship? 
62. An accident? 
63. A minor violation of the law (traffic ticket, etc.)? 
64. Being held in jail (DUI, felony, etc.)? 
65. The death of a close friend? 
66. A major decision regarding your immediate future? 
67. A major personal achievement? 
 
Financial 
A major change in finances: 
68. Increased income? 
69. Decreased income? 
70. Investment and/or credit difficulties? 
71. A loss or damage of personal property?
72. A moderate purchase (such as an automobile)? 
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73. A major purchase (such as a home?) 
74. A foreclosure of a mortgage or loan? 
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Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ-N) 
 
1. I feel like I’m up against the world. 
2. I’m no good. 
3. Why can’t I ever succeed? 
4. No one understands me. 
5. I’ve let people down. 
6. I don’t think I can go on. 
7. I wish I were a better person. 
8. I’m so weak. 
9. My life’s not going the way I want it to. 
10. I’m so disappointed in myself. 
11. Nothing feels good anymore. 
12. I can’t stand this anymore. 
13. I can’t get started. 
14. What’s wrong with me? 
15. I wish I were somewhere else. 
16. I can’t get things together. 
17. I hate myself. 
18. I’m worthless. 
19. Wish I could just disappear. 
20. What’s the matter with me? 
21. I’m a loser. 
22. My life is a mess. 
23. I’m a failure. 
24. I’ll never make it. 
25. I feel so hopeless. 
26. Something has to change. 
27. There must be something wrong with me. 
28. My future is bleak. 
29. It’s just not worth it. 
30. I can’t finish anything. 
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Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire – Positive (ATQ-P) 
Listed below are a variety of thoughts that pop into people’s heads. Please read each thought and 
indicate how frequently, if at all, the thought occurred to you over the last week. Please read each 
item carefully and fill in the blank with the appropriate number, using the following scale. 
1 = Not at all 2 = Sometimes   3 = Moderately often  4 = Often  5 = All the time 
1. I am respected by my peers. 
2. I have a good sense of humor. 
3. My future looks bright. 
4. I will be successful. 
5. I’m fun to be with. 
6. I am in a great mood. 
7. There are many people who care about me. 
8. I’m proud of my accomplishments. 
9. I will finish what I start. 
10. I have many good qualities. 
11. I am comfortable with life. 
12. I have a good way with others. 
13. I am a lucky person. 
14. I have friends who support me. 
15. Life is exciting. 
16. I enjoy a challenge. 
17. My social life is terrific. 
18. There’s nothing to worry about. 
19. I’m so relaxed. 
20. My life is running smoothly. 
21. I’m happy with the way I look. 
22. I take good care of myself. 
23. I deserve the best in life. 
24. Bad days are rare. 
25. I have many useful qualities. 
26. There is no problem that is hopeless. 
27. I won’t give up. 
28. I state my opinions with confidence. 
29. My life keeps getting better and better. 




Beck Depression Inventory 
Please read each group of statements carefully and choose the one statement in ach group which 
best describes the way you have been feeling for the past two weeks, including today. If several 
statements in a group seem to apply equally well, fill in the circle for each one. 
1. I do not feel sad. 
I feel sad. 
I am sad all the time and I can’t snap out of it. 
I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it. 
2. I am not particularly discouraged about the future. 
I feel discouraged about the future. 
I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve. 
3. I do not feel like a failure. 
I feel I have failed more than the average person. 
As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures. 
I feel I am a complete failure as a person. 
4. I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to. 
I don’t enjoy things the way I used to. 
I don’t get real satisfaction out of anything anymore. 
I am dissatisfied or bored with everyone. 
5. I don’t feel particularly guilty. 
I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
I feel guilty all of the time. 
6. I don’t feel I am being punished. 
I feel I may be punished. 
I expect to be punished. 
I feel I am being punished. 
7. I don’t feel disappointed in myself. 
I am disappointed in myself. 
I am disgusted with myself. 
I hate myself. 
8. I don’t feel I am any worse than anybody else. 
I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes. 
I blame myself all the time for my faults. 
I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
9. I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself. 
I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
I would like to kill myself. 
I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
10. I don’t cry any more than usual. 
I cry more now than I used to. 
I cry all the time now. 
I used to be able to cry, but now I can’t cry even though I want to. 
11. I am no more irritated now than I ever am.
I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to. 
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I feel irritated all the time now. 
I don’t get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me. 
12. I have not lost interest in other people. 
I am less interested in other people than I used to be. 
I have lost most of my interest in other people. 
I have lost all of my interest in other people. 
13. I make decisions about as well as I ever did. 
I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before. 
I can’t make decisions at all anymore. 
14. I don’t feel I look any worse than I used to. 
I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me unattractive. 
I believe that I look ugly. 
15. I can work about as well as before. 
It takes an extra effort to get started at doing anything. 
I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
I can’t do any work at all. 
16. I can sleep as well as usual. 
I don’t sleep as well as I used to. 
I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep. 
I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep. 
17. I don’t get more tired than usual. 
I get tired more easily than usual. 
I get tired from doing almost anything. 
I am too tired to do anything. 
18. My appetite is not worse than usual. 
My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
My appetite is much worse now. 
I have no appetite at all anymore. 
19. I haven’t lost much weight, if any. 
I have lost more than 5 pounds. 
I have lost more than 10 pounds. 
I have lost more than 15 pounds. 
20. I am no more worried about my health than usual. 
I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains; or upset stomach; or 
constipation. 
I am very worried about physical problems and it’s hard to think of much else. 
I am so worried about my physical problems that I can’t think about anything else. 
21. I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
I am much less interested in sex now. 




Beck Anxiety Inventory 
Below is a list of common symptoms of anxiety.   Please carefully read each it m in the list.  
Indicate how much you have been bothered by that symptom during the past month, including 
today, by circling the number in the corresponding space in the column next to each symptom. 
 Not At All Mildly but it 
didn’t bother me 
much.  
Moderately - it 
wasn’t pleasant 
at times 
Severely – it 
bothered me a 
lot 
Numbness or tingling 0 1 2 3 
Feeling hot 0 1 2 3 
Wobbliness in legs 0 1 2 3 
Unable to relax 0 1 2 3 
Fear of worst happening 0 1 2 3 
Dizzy or lightheaded 0 1 2 3 
Heart pounding/racing 0 1 2 3 
Unsteady 0 1 2 3 
Terrified or afraid 0 1 2 3 
Nervous 0 1 2 3 
Feeling of choking 0 1 2 3 
Hands trembling 0 1 2 3 
Shaky / unsteady 0 1 2 3 
Fear of losing control 0 1 2 3 
Difficulty in breathing 0 1 2 3 
Fear of dying 0 1 2 3 
Scared 0 1 2 3 
Indigestion 0 1 2 3 
Faint / lightheaded 0 1 2 3 
Face flushed 0 1 2 3 




Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) 
The 20 items below refer to how you have felt and behaved during the last week. Choose the 
appropriate response. 
1. I was bothered by things that don't usually bother me. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with the help of my family or friends. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
4. I felt that I was just as good as other people. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
6. I felt depressed. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
7. I felt everything I did was an effort. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
8. I felt hopeful about the future. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
9. I thought my life had been a failure.
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
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 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
10. I felt fearful. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
11. My sleep was restless. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
12. I was happy. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
13. I talked less than usual. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
14. I felt lonely. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
15. People were unfriendly. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
16. I enjoyed life. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
17. I had crying spells. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
18. I felt sad. 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days)
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
19. I felt that people disliked me. 
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 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 
 Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
20. I could not get "going". 
 Rarely or none of the time (<1 day) 
 Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
 Occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3-4 days) 




Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version 
 
On this questionnaire are groups of 5 statements. Please read each group of statement  carefully. 
Then pick out the one statement in each group which best describes the way you have felt
DURING THE TIME IN YOUR LIFE when you felt the MOST depressed, down, or sad.  
 
1. I did not feel sad or depressed. 
I occasionally felt sad or down. 
I felt sad most of the time, but I could snap out of it. 
I felt sad all of the time, and I couldn’t snap out of it. 
I felt so sad or unhappy that I couldn’t stand it. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
2. My energy level was normal. 
My energy level was occasionally a little lower than normal. 
I got tired more easily or had less energy than usual. 
I got tired from doing almost anything. 
I felt tired and exhausted almost all of the time. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
3. I had not been feeling more restless and fidgety than usual. 
I felt a little more restless or fidgety than usual. 
I had been very fidgety, and I had some difficulty sitting still in a chair. 
I had been extremely fidgety, and I had been pacing a little bit almost each day. 
I had been pacing more than an hour a day, and I couldn’t sit still. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
4. I had not been talking or moving more slowly than usual. 
I talked a little slower than usual. 
I spoke slower than usual and it took me longer to respond to questions but I could still 
carry on a normal conversation. 
Normal conversations were difficult because it was hard to start talking. 
I felt extremely slowed down physically, like I was stuck in the mud. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
5. I had not lost interest in my usual activities. 
I was a little less interested in 1 or 2 of my usual activities. 
I was less interested in several of my usual activities. 
I had lost most of my interest in almost all of my usual activities.
I had lost all interest in all of my usual activities. 
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If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
6. I got as much pleasure out of my usual activities as usual. 
I got a little less pleasure from 1 or 2 of my usual activities. 
I got less pleasure from several of my usual activities. 
I got almost no pleasure from most of the activities which I usually enjoy. 
I got no pleasure from any of the activities I usually enjoy. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
7. I had not noticed any change in my interest in sex. 
I was only slightly less interested in sex than usual. 
There was a noticeable decrease in my interest in sex. 
I was much less interested in sex. 
I had lost all interest in sex. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
8. I had not been feeling guilty. 
I occasionally felt a little guilty. 
I often felt guilty. 
I felt quite guilty most of the time. 
I felt extremely guilty most of the time. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
9. I did not feel like a failure. 
My opinion of myself was occasionally a little low. 
I felt I was inferior to most people. 
I felt like a failure. 
I felt I was a totally worthless person. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
10. I didn’t have any thoughts of death or suicide. 
I occasionally thought life was not worth living. 
I frequently thought of dying in passive ways (such as going to sleep and not wakingup) 
or that I’d be better off dead. 
I had frequent thoughts of killing myself but I did not carry them out. 
I would have killed myself if I had the chance.
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If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
11. I could concentrate as well as usual. 
My ability to concentrate was slightly worse than usual. 
It was harder and took longer to make decisions, but I did make them. 
I was unable to make some decisions. 
I couldn’t make any decisions at all. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
12. I made decisions as well as I usually do. 
Decision making was slightly more difficult than usual. 
It was harder and took longer to make decisions, but I did make them. 
I was unable to make some decisions. 
I couldn’t make any decisions at all. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
13. My appetite was less than normal. 
My appetite was slightly worse than usual. 
My appetite was clearly not as good as usual, but I still ate. 
My appetite was much worse. 
I had no appetite at all, and I had to force myself to eat even a little. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
14. I hadn’t lost any weight. 
I lost less than 5 pounds. 
I lost between 5 and 10 pounds. 
I lost between 11 and 25 pounds. 
I lost more than 25 pounds. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
 Had you been dieting or deliberately trying to lose weight? 
 
15. My appetite was not greater than normal. 
My appetite was slightly greater than usual. 
My appetite was clearly greater than usual. 
My appetite was much greater than usual. 
I felt hungry all the time.
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If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
16. I hadn’t gained any weight. 
I gained less than 5 pounds. 
I gained between 5 and 10 pounds. 
I gained between 10 and 25 pounds. 
I gained more than 25 pounds. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
17. I did not sleep less than normal. 
I occasionally had slight difficulty sleeping. 
I clearly didn’t sleep as well as usual. 
I slept about half my normal amount of time. 
I slept less than 2 hours per night. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, which of these sleep problems had you experienced? 
 I had difficulty falling asleep. 
 My sleep was fitful and restless. 
 I woke up earlier than usual and could not fall back asleep. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
18. I was not sleeping more than normal. 
I occasionally slept more than normal. 
I frequently slept at least 1 hour more than normal. 
I frequently slept at least 2 hours more than normal. 
I frequently slept at least 3 hours more than normal. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
19. I did not feel anxious, nervous, or tense. 
I occasionally felt a little anxious. 
I often felt anxious. 
I felt very anxious most of the time. 
I felt terrified and near panic. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
20. I did not feel discouraged about the future. 
I occasionally felt a little discouraged about the future.
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I often felt discouraged about the future. 
I felt very discouraged about the future most of the time. 
I felt that the future was hopeless and that things would never improve. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
21. I did not feel irritated or annoyed. 
I occasionally got a little more irritated than normal. 
I got irritated or annoyed by things that didn’t usually bother me. 
I felt irritated or annoyed almost all of the time. 
I felt so depressed that I didn’t get irritated at all by things that used to bother me. 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
22. I was not worried about my physical health. 
I was occasionally concerned about bodily aches and pains. 
I was worried about my physical health. 
I was very worried about my physical health. 
I was so worried about my physical health that I could not think about anything else. 
 
If you answered choice 2, 3, 4, or 5, did you feel this way for more or less than two 
weeks? 
 
23. When you were having these problems the most, was it after the death of a friend or 
relative? 
 
24. When you were having these problems the most, did you seek treatment or professional 
help? 
 
 
 
